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ABSTRACT
The impact of the technological revolution on the operation of the
discovery system in the federal courts has been dramatic. The enor-
mous increase in storage capacity and communication that the use of
computers in the corporate world has brought about has corre-
spondingly increased both the burdens and stakes of the discovery
process. This Article considers the extent to which these dramatic
practical changes have created a need to develop a legal framework
especially for the discovery of electronically stored information. Be-
cause the burdens of electronic discovery are likely to be substantially
more severe than those involved in traditional discovery, the drafters
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the courts should adopt a
conditional cost-shifting model solely for use in the electronic discov-
ery context. Ultimately, the model must be informed by the deep
structural values underlying the litigation system.
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It was neither a comet nor a dramatic climactic change that killed off
the dinosaurs. They perished because they could not adapt to the
digital age.
Jerold S. Solovy & Robert L. Byman1
INTRODUCTION
Since its inception, the modern discovery process has been the
subject of substantial controversy.2 Dispute was widespread at the
time of the process’s adoption as part of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1938, which made discovery an instrumental part of the
revolutionary notice pleading system,3 and the debate has continued
vigorously ever since. Indeed, in the last generation the discovery
process in the federal courts has been modified substantially on four
separate occasions.4 Yet many in the legal community remain unsatis-
fied.5 Such vigorous disagreements should not be surprising, because
in important ways the discovery process is reminiscent of human-
kind’s discovery of fire: While capable of providing great benefits to
society, if misused it also is capable of causing severe harm. By ena-
bling litigants to acquire relevant information that otherwise may be
unavailable to them, discovery serves the interests of procedural jus-
tice and facilitates enforcement of the societal policy choices embod-
ied in controlling substantive law. But discovery is by no means cos-
tless, either to litigants or to society. The numerous and dramatic
1. Digital Discovery, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 27, 1999, at A16.
2. For the most part, the discovery debate has focused on the extent to which courts
should restrict litigants’ use of discovery to protect against the imposition of excessive costs and
burdens. See generally, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical
Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691 (1998) (discussing how
and why discovery rules have changed since the turn of the twentieth century).
3. Id. at 710–39. For a discussion of the origins and philosophy of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, see generally Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1986).
4. The rules affecting or involving discovery were amended in 1980, 1983, 1993 and 2000.
FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b), 30(f), 33(c), 34(b), 37(b)–(c), 45(d) (amended 1980); FED. R. CIV. P.
26(a)–(b) (amended 1983); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)–(g), 28(b), 29, 30(a)–(f), 31(a), 32(a), 32(c),
33(a)–(d), 34(b), 36(a), 37 (a), 37(c), 37(d), 37(g) (amended 1993); FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (amended
2000).
5. See infra Part III.B.
REDISH.DOC 01/25/02 3:26 PM
564 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:561
shifts in discovery regulation that have plagued the Federal Rules in
recent years reflect these tensions.
Although the rules’ drafters and revisers over the years appear—
at least so far—to have failed to fashion a discovery process that satis-
fies most people, the bad news is that discovery problems are rapidly
becoming more complex and pervasive in ways the original drafters of
the Federal Rules likely never dreamed about. The technological ex-
plosion has altered dramatically both the nature and stakes of those
problems. It hardly could be disputed that, in the words of one
authority, “[c]omputer technology has revolutionized the way we deal
with information and the way we run our businesses. Increasingly,
important business information is being created, stored and commu-
nicated electronically.”6 Not surprisingly, then, “[t]he discovery of
electronic evidence has become the modern litigator’s newest tool (or
some would say, weapon).”7
There are numerous ways in which electronic evidence can be
strategically vital in modern litigation. For example, electronic evi-
dence has proven crucial in determining the outcome in cases involv-
ing allegations of sexual harassment, disputes over trade secrets,
copyright infringement, and insider trading.8 Indeed, one need only
recall the dramatic use of damaging e-mails during cross-examination
in the Microsoft antitrust litigation9 to see how important electronic
evidence has become. It is therefore only natural that the discovery of
electronic evidence has assumed enormous importance in modern
litigation.10
To be sure, the explosion in communications technology has fa-
cilitated the discovery process in important ways due to substantial
6. ALAN M. GAHTAN, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE 1 (1999).
7. Id. at 10. “As companies and individuals have increased their reliance on their com-
puter systems, lawyers and investigators have begun to realize the valuable electronic treasures
that are now being kept in these systems and have started aggressively to target electronic data
for discovery and production in all types of cases.” Id. at 1 (citation omitted).
8. E.g., First Tech. Safety Sys., Inc. v. Depinet, 11 F.3d 641, 645–46 (6th Cir. 1993) (trade
secrets); Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1330 (7th Cir. 1996) (sexual harassment); Harley v.
McCoach, 928 F. Supp. 533, 537 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (sexual harassment); Smith v. SEC, 129 F.3d
356, 359–64 (6th Cir. 1997) (insider trading); see Mike Tonsing, Electronic Mail Is Ubiquitous
and Its Consequences Are Enormous, FED. LAW., May 1999, at 56 (describing several cases that
involved incriminating e-mail evidence).
9. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
10. See Kimberly D. Richard, Note and Comment, Electronic Evidence: To Produce or Not
to Produce, That Is the Question, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 463, 464 (1999) (“Electronic evidence is
quickly becoming a central focus of litigation discovery in American courts, which presents
enormous problems for lawyers.”) (citation omitted).
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improvements in the ease of accessing information. However, once
again in a manner reminiscent of the discovery of fire, the technologi-
cal explosion simultaneously has given rise to an entirely new set of
difficulties that threaten to distort the discovery process and signifi-
cantly skew the delicate balance of values the procedural system
serves.11
The dramatic growth of electronic discovery12 has given rise to an
entirely new set of theoretical and practical disputes, which fall
largely into two categories. The first concerns whether the problems
electronic discovery causes deserve unique treatment in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure; the second concerns the determination of
what that treatment should be. The first category may be viewed from
two different perspectives. Initially, the question arises whether the
problems electronic discovery creates are sufficiently distinct from the
problems caused by traditional discovery to warrant unique treat-
ment. If one were to answer this question in the negative, then natu-
rally one would not need to deal with the remaining issue of what
kind of treatment is merited. However, one could decide that elec-
tronic discovery does, in fact, give rise to a unique set of problems, yet
nevertheless conclude that special treatment in the Federal Rules is
unwarranted. One could reach this conclusion on the basis of the
premise that, as a structural matter, the rules should provide rela-
tively limited control over discretion to determine how best to control
discovery in individual cases.13 Alternatively, one could conclude that
11. For a detailed description of these values, see infra Part III.
12. The phrase “electronic discovery” is used here to refer to efforts to discover electronic
documents. An electronic document has been defined as “information intentionally created by a
computer user and stored in electronic form.” Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic
Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 333 (2000)
(citation omitted). According to other authorities,
[w]hile a company’s central computer system is the most obvious source of electronic
data, an attorney may also want to request information stored on palm pilots, home
computers and lap tops. Data may be found in many other places including on floppy
disks, back-up tapes, punch cards, e-mail, word processing documents, computerized
spreadsheets, accounting files, wide area networks, private sites and voice mail. Addi-
tionally . . . some appliances and machines contain central processing units that have
some memory capability, and information stored within these units might become
relevant, in a particular case.
Dale M. Cendali & Lydia R. Zaidman, Electronic Discovery, in 1 FOURTH ANNUAL INTERNET
LAW INSTITUTE 895, 903 (Practicing Law Institute ed., 2000).
13. Such a conclusion would flow from adoption of the so-called “managerial” model of the
litigation process, a controversial view that places ultimate discretion in the court to manage the
course of the litigation. See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374
(1982) (asserting that judges play a more active role in litigation than in the past). I discuss court
management of discovery further infra at Part IV.C.
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the problems to which electronic discovery gives rise do not differ
meaningfully from the problems traditional discovery causes and
therefore do not deserve unique treatment, even if one rejects the no-
tion that the rules should give judges broad discretion.
Close examination of the technological differences between elec-
tronic and traditional discovery and the nature and number of diffi-
culties that flow from them suggests that electronic discovery deserves
unique treatment. It is certainly true that electronic discovery bears
many similarities to the traditional process, and it is therefore not
surprising that electronic discovery causes many of the same prob-
lems that traditional discovery causes. Even from this perspective, a
strong argument can be fashioned that electronic discovery deserves
unique treatment, because electronic discovery is likely to give rise to
those same problems more often or more severely than traditional
discovery.14 Despite some similarities, the differences between the two
forms of discovery are, on both technological and practical levels,
fundamental. The resulting difficulties for the adjudicatory system
therefore also differ fundamentally.15
Thus, the only means by which one could conclude that elec-
tronic discovery does not deserve special treatment in the rules of
civil procedure would be to commit to the virtually unlimited case-by-
case judicial discretion dictated by the “managerial model.”16 This
model suffers from many problems, however. Because the model
gives judges vast freedom in individual cases, it effectively places so-
ciety in a policy straightjacket that prevents it from deciding how best
to manage discovery problems. Since judges are permitted to fashion
solutions to discovery problems in individual cases largely free from
categorical direction on the basis of a priori policy choices, society is
deprived of the opportunity to make such choices among competing
values. This is a cost that on a number of occasions the rules’ drafters
have been unwilling to bear, and they therefore have chosen to send
trial judges particular substantive messages about how value choices
are to be made.17 Another problem with the managerial model is that
a commitment to unguided case-by-case discretion lessens predict-
14. See infra Part II.B.
15. Id.
16. See supra note 13.
17. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) (providing guidelines as to the circumstances under
which judges may limit discovery methods).
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ability for litigants, who therefore may be hampered significantly in
their efforts to plan their primary behavior.18
Recognizing both electronic discovery’s unique character and the
need for the Federal Rules to deal with the resulting problems in
some generalized manner may raise more questions than it resolves.
For one then must shape specific categorical rules for the treatment of
electronic discovery. What the content of those rules should be is not
immediately evident.19 No scholarly work has sought to fashion a
model to remedy the problems of electronic discovery by reference to
the first principles that provide the foundation of the procedural sys-
tem. This Article undertakes such an effort.
Procedural issues, like most legal questions, are capable of being
viewed on three analytical levels. On the most concrete level, one
may consider and debate how legal standards are properly to be ap-
plied in an individual case. Such an inquiry may be described as
“third-level” analysis. One also may inquire into the proper content
of general standards of conduct within the procedural system. Such
efforts may be described as “second-level” analysis. Finally, one may
examine the normative “deep structure” of intersecting and compet-
ing goals and values that lies at the foundation of the modern proce-
dural system. This may be described as “first-level” analysis. Schol-
arly debate about the procedural system traditionally has focused on
second-level analysis, taking for granted the underlying normative
goal structure on which generalized rules ultimately are premised. In
the case of electronic discovery, scholars’ exclusive focus on second-
level analysis has been largely unsuccessful. Scholars thus far have
failed to recognize the need for unique treatment of electronic dis-
covery and therefore have not developed an acceptable method for
18. By “primary behavior,” I mean the day-to-day personal and commercial planning in
which individuals and businesses regularly engage. See MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 231 (2d ed. 1990) (assert-
ing that a case-by-case balancing approach creates uncertainty in citizens’ planning of their so-
cial and commercial conduct); see also infra Part III.
19. To date, there has been a substantial amount of scholarship concerning the problems of
electronic discovery. Much of it has been descriptive, focusing on the technological and practical
operation of the process. Other scholarly efforts commendably have attempted to fashion nor-
mative structural solutions to the problem. See, e.g., Mark D. Robins, Computers and the Dis-
covery of Evidence—A New Dimension to Civil Procedure, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 411, 413 (1999) (reviewing cases in which computer-related discovery has been granted
or denied, and recommending specific electronic discovery practices for judges and litigators);
Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 12, at 341–67 (describing the evolution of discovery rules over
the past century).
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shaping that treatment. What is called for, then, is a return to first-
level analysis: an inquiry into the matrix of abstract meta-goals which
provide the normative foundation for the adjudicatory system in the
first place.
Such a foundational inquiry possesses vitally important implica-
tions for the current debate over electronic discovery. Although de-
tailed examination of the technological and practical operation of
electronic discovery demonstrates that the problems to which the
process gives rise are to a large extent unique, examination of the liti-
gation system’s underlying matrix of normative goals demonstrates an
entirely different rationale for the special treatment of electronic dis-
covery. Moreover, examination of the litigation matrix’s implications
enables one to determine how best to shape the second-level rules
that should guide the control of electronic discovery in individual
cases.
This Article undertakes such a first-level analysis in an effort
both to rationalize the need for electronic discovery’s special treat-
ment and to shape an answer to the second-level analytical question
of how best to deal with the problems of electronic discovery. While
of course there exists no official listing of the systemic meta-goals un-
derlying the civil adjudicatory process, it is appropriate to recognize a
consensus view of such foundational and aspirational precepts.
My examination of this litigation matrix20 and its application to
the discovery process demonstrates that although its meta-values are
widely accepted on a purely abstract, normative level, they often have
been ignored or violated in the modern discovery process. Ironically,
even when the rules’ drafters commendably have sought to bring the
discovery process into conformity with the underlying matrix, they of-
ten have adopted measures that contravene other elements of the ma-
trix.21 As a result, even in the context of traditional discovery the sys-
tem has operated to a significant extent under rules that are
fundamentally inconsistent with the deep value structure underlying
20. By “matrix” I refer to the synthesis of the fundamental social, moral, political, and eco-
nomic values society seeks to foster in shaping its civil litigation process. On occasion, those val-
ues will interact in a reinforcing manner because they will be simultaneously advanced by use of
a particular procedure. In other instances, however, the values may be in tension or even in di-
rect conflict because use of a particular procedure may simultaneously advance one value while
undermining another. For a detailed discussion of both the specific norms that should be recog-
nized as making up this value matrix and the implications of the matrix for issues of electronic
discovery control, see infra Part III.
21. See infra Part III.
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modern civil procedure, thereby skewing both the operation and im-
pact of the procedural system. The problem is not simply that the sys-
tem has allowed the continuation of widespread discovery abuse, al-
though that is largely true. The problems run considerably deeper.
They also concern the procedural inefficiencies and substantive dis-
tortions that result from the system’s choice, in the overwhelming
majority of situations, to require the parties to bear the full costs of
responding to the discovery requests of other litigants.22 Because liti-
gants do not bear the costs created by their discovery requests, their
incentive to confine those requests in a procedurally efficient manner
is significantly distorted. The inescapable result is substantial waste
and inefficiency in the conduct of discovery. Moreover, the current
method of allocating discovery costs may significantly distort society’s
economic choices well beyond the four walls of the courtroom. Such
distortions are blatantly inconsistent with the meta-values that make
up the litigation matrix, which include both concerns for maintaining
procedural efficiency and for minimizing the impact of procedural
rules on people’s primary behavior.
Part I examines the present status of electronic discovery in the
courts. It concludes that current doctrine is in a state of confusion that
for the most part ignores important differences between electronic
and traditional discovery and that fails to provide meaningful guid-
ance to litigants or courts. Part II explores the technological and prac-
tical aspects of electronic discovery that distinguish it from traditional
discovery. Part III turns to first-level analysis, examining the deep
structure underlying the civil adjudicatory system embodied in the
litigation matrix. It then considers the implications of the matrix for
discovery rules. Part IV develops a model I refer to as the “condi-
tional cost-shifting” model, which, I believe, better realizes the goals
of the litigation matrix than does the current structure for controlling
discovery. It also explains why that model is appropriately confined to
the category of electronic discovery. In addition, it examines the va-
lidity and implications of the managerial model of discovery control
and explains why the managerial model should not be employed to
reject special treatment of electronic discovery.
In theory, at least, the litigation matrix dictates a detailed re-
structuring of cost allocation in discovery. Under my conditional cost-
shifting model, a litigant’s costs of producing documents and data not
reasonably available in the ordinary course of business are presump-
22. See infra Part III.
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tively shifted to the litigant who has made the discovery request.
However, if, in an individual instance, the adjudicator determines that
such cost-shifting fails to bring about a satisfactory resolution, either
because the discovering litigant is unable to bear those costs or be-
cause cost-shifting fails to avoid the imposition of significant burdens
on the party from whom discovery is sought, the adjudicator is to in-
quire into the comparative costs and benefits to which the discovery
will give rise to determine the propriety of ordering the discovery.
Restructuring the discovery system to make it conform more
closely to the normative dictates of the litigation matrix, however,
gives rise to an entirely new set of difficulties. For as I will show, such
a restructuring is not costless to the values underlying the procedural
system. One may best deal with this dilemma, I believe, by confining
that restructuring of cost allocation to the electronic discovery arena.
Such a limitation restricts the incidental costs of restructuring to the
category of cases in which one can predict that the negative effects of
the current discovery system are most apparent and the need for re-
structuring is greatest.
Perhaps the point may best be understood by analogizing to the
use of an experimental drug. Because the drug carries potentially
harmful side-effects, doctors do not prescribe it to every patient suf-
fering from the illness. Rather, they prescribe it only in cases in which
the illness is serious enough to justify the risks inherent in the drug.
Like the hypothetical experimental drug, the conditional cost-shifting
model proposed here could do much to cure the problems that plague
the discovery system. At the same time, however, the model would
carry potentially harmful side effects.
For these reasons, the conditional cost-shifting model should be
confined to cases of electronic discovery. Because of electronic dis-
covery’s differences from traditional discovery, it is reasonable to
predict that electronic discovery is likely to give rise to the problems
associated with traditional cost-allocation rules in a substantially in-
tensified form, as compared to traditional discovery. It is therefore
possible to predict that imposition of the harms associated with the
modified cost-shifting model are justified only in the context of elec-
tronic discovery.
Part V explores a related discovery issue, the rules for regulating
and punishing a litigant’s spoliation of evidence, in the context of
electronic discovery. While spoliation issues have not been dealt with
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, their common law develop-
ment by the courts naturally has enormous implications for a litigant’s
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conduct during discovery. As in the case of discovery, courts too often
ignore the unique implications of electronic record-keeping for the
fashioning of spoliation rules. Part V concludes that electronically
shared information deserves special treatment in the spoliation con-
text, as well as in the discovery context, and presents a model of spo-
liation control for electronic evidence that is consistent with the nor-
mative dictates of the litigation matrix.
I.  ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY IN THE COURTS
A. The Discoverability of Electronic Evidence
In examining the current treatment of electronic discovery in the
courts, it is necessary to consider four issues. The first concerns the
discoverability of electronic evidence: To what extent do the existing
discovery rules apply to electronic evidence? The second involves the
extent to which the courts are willing to protect parties from burden-
some or expensive electronic discovery. The third focuses on the ex-
tent to which courts are willing to shift the costs of electronic discov-
ery from the responding party to the requesting party. The final issue
concerns the extent to which, in resolving the three prior issues,
courts treat electronic discovery differently from traditional discov-
ery.
The answer to the first question seems clear. In the words of one
federal district court, often echoed by other decisions, “[i]t is now
axiomatic that electronically stored information is discoverable under
Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if it otherwise meets
the relevancy standard prescribed by the rules.”23 The 1970 amend-
ment to Rule 34 expressly extended the scope of document discovery
to include at least certain types of electronically stored material.24 In
23. Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 461 (D. Utah 1985); see also Crown Life Ins.
Co. v. Craig, 995 F.2d 1376, 1383 (7th Cir. 1993) (construing Rule 34(a)(1) to allow discovery of
electronically stored information and data compilations, including raw data); Playboy Enters.,
Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1053 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (“Defendant has cited no cases finding
that electronically stored data is exempt from discovery.”); In re Brand Name Prescription
Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 997, 1995 WL 360526, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995)
(“Rules 26(b) and 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instruct that computer-stored in-
formation is discoverable under the same rules that pertain to tangible, written materials.”);
Santiago v. Miles, 121 F.R.D. 636, 640 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) (“A request for raw information in
computer banks is proper and the information is obtainable under the discovery rules.”).
24. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) (providing that “[a]ny party may serve on any other party a
request . . . to produce . . . any designated documents (including writings . . . and other data
REDISH.DOC 01/25/02 3:26 PM
572 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:561
its accompanying explanatory note, the Advisory Committee clarified
the scope of its change:
The inclusive description of “documents” is revised to accord with
changing technology. It makes clear that Rule 34 applies to elec-
tronic data compilations from which information can be obtained
only with the use of detection devices, and that when the data can as
a practical matter be made usable by the discovering party only
through respondent’s devices, respondent may be required to use his
devices to translate the data into useable form. In many instances,
this means that respondent will have to supply a printout of com-
puter data.25
Thus, although doubt may be raised about the ease with which
Rule 34 applies to electronic discovery,26 it is well established that
electronically stored data is subject to discovery. Indeed, on occasion
courts have even required responding parties to write software to ex-
tract requested information and to assist the discovering party in con-
struing information stored on computer tape.27
Conceivably, one argument could be that although the 1970
amendment makes clear that computer data is discoverable, the
amendment’s reach does not necessarily extend to forms of electroni-
cally stored data that differ from the normal type of computer data
and that were developed after the amendment’s enactment—for ex-
ample, e-mail. However, in the words of one group of commentators,
“[t]he absence of any recent decisional law or commentary taking a
contrary position illustrates that if there were doubts as to whether
Rule 34 permitted discovery of electronic documents such as e-mail
when it was amended in 1970, those doubts now have been univer-
sally dispelled.”28 The same commentators suggest that doubts exist as
to whether Rule 34 extends to some of the newest forms of electronic
compilations from which information can be obtained, translated, if necessary, by the respon-
dent through detection devices into reasonably usable form)”).
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note (1970); cf. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 1053
(“The Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 . . . makes [sic] it clear that information
stored in computer format is discoverable.”).
26. See Robins, supra note 19, at 477 (“[T]he framework of Rule[] . . . 34 does not fit aptly
to the discovery of computer-related evidence.”).
27. See, e.g., Bills, 108 F.R.D. at 461 (citing Nat’l Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. In-
dus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1980), in which the court required the responding party to
develop programs to collect, to read, and to interpret the requested information for the discov-
ering party).
28. Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 12, at 350–51.
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storage.29 But other commentators are probably correct in predicting
that as courts become more comfortable with electronic discovery,
they will continue to extend the reach of the category of discoverable
material to newer and more esoteric forms of electronically stored
data.30
Although some questions remain concerning the outer reaches of
Rule 34’s application to electronic discovery, these questions pale in
comparison to the uncertainties plaguing some of the terms and con-
ditions that are to be imposed on electronic discovery’s production.
The case law is largely inconsistent, primarily because the rules either
fail to deal adequately with these discovery issues or fail (by design)
to provide judges with substantial guidance in individual cases.31 Al-
though commentators have noted this lack of guidance and resultant
unpredictability in the context of electronic discovery,32 the prob-
lem—if, indeed, it is accurate to characterize it as a problem33—ap-
pears not to be so limited. Rather, the intended structure of discovery
control generally vests considerable authority in the adjudicator in
the individual case. Thus, although Rule 26(c) allows a court to issue
protective orders against oppressive or harassing discovery,34 and
29. Id. at 351 (“[W]hether the Rules permit discovery of the newest forms of electronic
evidence such as cookies, temporary files and residual data remains an open question.”).
30. Edward Flanders et al., What Every Company Needs to Know About Electronic Evi-
dence Discovery, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL, Sept. 1999, at 16.
31. See, e.g., Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526, 532 (1st Cir. 1996) (“Discovery
matters are for the informed discretion of the district court, and the breadth of that discretion in
managing pre-trial mechanics and discovery is very great.”) (citation omitted).
32. According to Scheindlin and Rabkin, courts ruling on Rule 34 motions concerning elec-
tronic discovery “have generally approached these questions in a highly fact-specific manner,
producing few general principles to aid in the resolution of similar disputes.” Scheindlin &
Rabkin, supra note 12, at 361. As a result, “[t]he courts are left to develop procedural standards
regarding electronic discovery under Rule 34 in the absence of express guidance from the Rules
themselves. To date, however, little consensus has developed as to what these principles should
be.” Id.; see also Robins, supra note 19, at 412 (“[C]ourts are hindered not only by technological
obstacles to understanding the issues [created by electronic discovery] but also by the lack of
any coherent body of law organizing the handful of relevant precedents in this largely-
discretionary realm of adjudication.”); James J. Marcellino & Anthony A. Bongiorno, E-Mail Is
the Hottest Topic in Discovery Disputes, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 3, 1997, at B10 (“Decisions in [the
electronic evidence] area have been ad hoc and fact-specific.”).
33. The model of individualized decisionmaking in discovery is traditionally associated
with a managerial approach, which has been the subject of controversy. See infra Part IV.C.
34. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) provides in relevant part:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought . . . and for
good cause shown, the court . . . may make any order which justice requires to protect
a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense . . . .
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Rule 26(b)(2) directs the court to prevent or control unduly burden-
some discovery,35 neither provision provides a court with substantial
guidance as to the meaning of those phrases. Though such broad-
based discretion gives rise to obvious problems,36 there appears to be
no reason to believe that the structure will change in the foreseeable
future. Because courts generally have treated electronic discovery in-
terchangeably with traditional discovery,37 they tend to approach both
types of discovery with the same methodologies. Hence, absent some
formalized recognition of the special needs of electronic discovery,
“courts will probably continue to balance . . . factors . . . in an ad hoc
fashion, while avoiding the question of whether a fundamental recali-
bration is needed.”38
B. Judicial Protection Against Burdensome Electronic Discovery
On a number of occasions courts have expended considerable ef-
fort in determining whether discovery of electronic evidence should
be limited or precluded because it would be unduly burdensome. In
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). Among other things, the rule authorizes the court to order “that the dis-
closure or discovery not be had.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1).
35. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2) provides in relevant part:
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods otherwise permitted under
these rules . . . shall be limited by the court if it determines that . . . the burden or ex-
pense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the
needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of
the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in
resolving the issues.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2). The rule was added in 1983 as a means of increasing a court’s powers
to prevent discovery abuse. 8 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2008.1 (2d ed. 1994). However, since its addition the
rule “seems to have created only a ripple in the case law, although some courts now acknowl-
edge that it is clearer than it was before that they should take responsibility for the amount of
discovery in cases they manage.” Id.
36. As Judge Easterbrook notes:
Multi-factor standards cut down on loopholes—the bane of rules—but at great cost.
When there is no rule of decision but only an injunction to consider everything that
turns out to matter, lawyers and clients cannot tell in advance—that is, when planing
conduct and conducting litigation—what the judge . . . will think matters.
Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery As Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 640 (1989) (footnote omitted);
see also Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 774 (1998)
(“Determining what is too much in a given case is often quite difficult for a judge, and a rule
change does not make it easier.”).
37. See supra note 23 and accompanying text; see also Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., No. 97-
2307, 1999 WL 462015, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 16, 1999) (“A discovery request aimed at
the production records retained in some electronic form is no different, in principle, from a re-
quest for documents contained in an office file cabinet.”).
38. Robins, supra note 19, at 483.
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so doing, however, they have not always agreed whether obvious
technological differences between electronic discovery and traditional
discovery should be acknowledged. No one appears to dispute the
fact that courts retain at least as much authority to protect against
burdensome electronic discovery as they do to protect against bur-
densome traditional discovery.39 The issue, rather, is whether courts
should recognize that electronic discovery gives rise to a special set of
difficulties that call for more vigorous judicial intervention than the
discovery process normally provides. On the whole, the answer ap-
pears to be no. Courts have held, as they generally do in traditional
discovery, that inconvenience and expense usually are not valid rea-
sons for the denial of electronic discovery.40 Courts have applied this
reasoning even where the responding party must bear the additional
expense of translating electronic data into a usable form.41
In several instances, however, courts—relying on traditional
tools of discovery control—have protected against burdensome elec-
tronic discovery. For example, in Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.,42 the
defendants produced wage cards containing certain requested statisti-
cal information.43 The plaintiffs then sought to compel production of
computer tapes the plaintiffs alleged contained information relevant
to the previously produced cards.44 The court of appeals upheld the
trial court’s refusal to grant the production request, even though it
would require the plaintiffs to spend more money to interpret the
wage cards.45 More recently, a district court in Playboy Enterprises,
Inc. v. Welles46 held that in permitting discovery of electronically
stored data, the producing party must be “protected against undue
39. See Murlas Living Trust v. Mobil Oil Corp., No. 93 C 6956, 1995 WL 124186, at *5
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 1995) (applying protective orders under Rule 26(c), which are equally avail-
able in both traditional and electronic discovery, to requested discovery of a computer data-
base).
40. See, e.g., Toledo Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 703 N.E.2d 340, 354 (Ohio
Ct. Com. Pl. Jan. 17, 1996) (“[I]nconvenience and expense, by themselves, do not justify denying
discovery.”).
41. See Daewoo Elec. Co. v. United States, 650 F. Supp. 1003, 1006 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1986)
(“The normal and reasonable translation of electronic data into a form usable by the discover-
ing party should be the ordinary and foreseeable burden of a respondent in the absence of a
showing of extraordinary hardship.”).
42. 665 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1982).
43. Id. at 932.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 933.
46. 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
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burden and expense and/or invasion of privileged matter.”47 The
plaintiff had requested access to the defendant’s personal computer
hard drive to attempt to recover deleted files, to review certain e-mail
messages, and to produce relevant documents.48 The plaintiff argued
that it needed access to defendant’s hard drive because the defen-
dant’s practice of deleting e-mail messages made it impossible to pro-
duce the information in paper form.49 The court determined that it
was likely that the defendant’s hard drive contained the relevant in-
formation, but in allowing the plaintiff access it outlined a specific
protocol to ensure protection against an invasion of privileged mat-
ter.50 The court appointed a neutral computer expert to serve as an of-
ficer of the court and create a “mirror image” of defendant’s hard
drive.51 The court allowed defense counsel to review the recovered
documents and to produce only those documents that were respon-
sive and relevant.52
Perhaps the most interesting of these cases is the First Circuit’s
decision in Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd.53 There the plaintiff in a
retaliatory discharge case had responded to defendant’s motion for
summary judgment with a request for additional time for discovery
pursuant to Rule 56(f),54 which allows a court to grant such a request
if the party opposing summary judgment is able to “‘articulate a plau-
sible basis for the belief that discoverable materials exist which would
raise a trial worthy issue.’”55 In affirming the district court’s refusal to
grant the plaintiff’s request for further discovery, the court of appeals
47. Id. at 1053.
48. Id. at 1051.
49. Id. at 1053.
50. Id. at 1054–55.
51. Id. at 1055.
52. Id.; see also In re Gen. Instrument Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 96 C 1129, 1999 WL 1072507,
at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 1999) (applying the cost-benefit analysis of Rule 26(b)(2) to deny re-
quested electronic discovery because of the substantial number of documents already produced
and the low probability that additional discovery would help prove the plaintiffs’ case).
53. 83 F.3d 526 (1st Cir. 1996).
54. Rule 56(f) provides that:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the [summary judgment] mo-
tion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to jus-
tify the party’s opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f).
55. Fennell, 83 F.3d at 532 (alteration in original) (quoting Price v. Gen. Motors Corp., 931
F.2d 162, 164 (1st Cir. 1991)).
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noted that “[i]n determining whether material is ‘discoverable,’ the
court should consider not only whether the material actually exists,
but the burdens and expenses entailed in obtaining the material.”56
It is difficult to know how much to glean from Fennell. On the
one hand, the case involved electronic discovery, and the court ap-
peared to impose a fairly demanding standard before discovery could
be justified. Arguably, then, the case could be construed to stand for
the proposition that courts should carefully consider burdens on the
respondent whenever electronic discovery is sought. It probably
would be a mistake to read the case this broadly, however. First,
though the case involved electronic discovery, nothing in the court’s
reasoning seemed to turn on that fact. Moreover, in affirming the dis-
trict court’s refusal to authorize further discovery, the court empha-
sized that “[d]iscovery matters are for the informed discretion of the
district court, and the breadth of that discretion in managing pre-trial
mechanics and discovery is very great.”57 It is likely, then, that the
court would have affirmed the district court’s decision whichever way
it had come out. Finally, the fact that the case concerned a motion for
an extension of discovery under Rule 56(f) arguably also distinguishes
it from the normal discovery situation, since such a motion always will
come after the time initially allotted for discovery has been com-
pleted. The one thing that is indisputable is that at no point in the
opinion did the court provide a careful discussion of the unique needs
of electronic discovery management. Hence, the doctrinal value of
Fennell as a basis for establishing a special rule of electronic discovery
is extremely limited. Thus, although cases that have imposed signifi-
cant limitations on the scope of electronic discovery exist,58 these
cases have not recognized in any thoughtful and consistent manner
the special needs of electronic discovery. Rather, courts uniformly
appear to treat electronic discovery in exactly the same manner as
they treat traditional discovery. And, because the ethos of modern
procedure is favorable to the widespread availability of discovery,59 in
many cases such an analysis will dictate a decision in favor of the
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. In addition to the cases already discussed, supra, at notes 39–57 and accompanying text,
see also Lawyers Title Ins. Co. v. U.S.F. & G., 122 F.R.D. 567, 570 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (refusing to
allow wholesale discovery of a computer system without a showing that such discovery would
lead to evidence that had not already been produced).
59. See infra Part III.B.
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party seeking discovery. This is equally true for electronic and tradi-
tional discovery.60
C. Cost-Shifting and Electronic Discovery
Of potentially enormous importance to the control of discovery
is the issue of cost allocation. Will a party required to respond to a
discovery request be forced to bear the full cost of preparing that re-
sponse, and, if not, on what basis are costs to be allocated? In the area
of cost allocation, courts have similarly failed to treat electronic dis-
covery differently than traditional discovery. And that approach—
with some notable exceptions—is to leave discovery costs where they
fall.61 To be sure, both Rules 26(c) and 26(b)(2) empower a court to
shift costs where it deems it necessary.62 However, the Rules fail to
provide any meaningful guidance to the court in exercising this discre-
tion and, in any event, pay no attention to the arguably special needs
60. See, e.g., Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 464 (D. Utah 1985) (stating that “in-
formation stored in computers should be as freely discoverable as information not stored in
computers”).
61. The Manual for Complex Litigation (Third) provides that “[t]he cost of seeking and
responding to discovery is a part of the cost of litigation each party normally must bear, subject
only to specific provisions for shifting contained in statutes or rules.” MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION (THIRD) § 21.433 (1995). The same section notes, however, that “[t]aken together,
[Rules 26(c) and 26(b)(2)] give the court broad authority to control the cost of discovery,” and
that “[r]eference to the court’s authority to shift costs will tend to give the parties an incentive
to use cost-effective means of obtaining information and a disincentive to engage in wasteful
and costly discovery activity.” Id.
 One group of commentators, it should be noted, asserts that “the courts will usually re-
quire the requesting party to pay for the responding party’s expenses in producing the data.”
Cendali & Zaidman, supra note 12, at 912. However, this assertion does not appear to be sup-
ported by the majority of the relevant case law. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.
156, 179 (1974) (noting that, traditionally, each party must bear the “ordinary burden of financ-
ing his own suit”). This statement seems to be just as true in the context of electronic discovery.
See Corinne L. Giacobbe, Note, Allocating Discovery Costs in the Computer Age: Deciding Who
Should Bear the Costs of Electronically Stored Data, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 257, 267 (2000)
(“[W]hen applying Rule 34 in cases involving discovery of electronically stored data, the major-
ity of courts have required that the producing party bear all the costs involved in complying with
discovery requests for computer data.”). The same commentator notes that “[w]hen presented
with defendants’ motions to shift the burden of discovery of electronically stored data, most
courts simply have denied these motions, even when the costs involved have been exorbitant.”
Id. at 269.
62. See Bills, 108 F.R.D. at 462 (“Rule 26(c) commonly has been interpreted to grant
courts the power to shift the financial burden of discovery where, in the court’s discretion, such
a shifting is warranted.”). The Advisory Committee’s note to Rule 26(c), however, “gives the
Court no guidance as to how properly to determine whether the burden or expense is ‘undue’
where discovery of computer stored information is involved.” Id.
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of electronic discovery.63 Thus, courts are, for all practical purposes,
free to make cost allocation decisions on the basis of virtually any ra-
tionale they may choose to employ. If these choices are consistent
with each other or in accordance with the social and political choices
that would be made by society as a whole, it is purely fortuitous. Not
surprisingly, because of the delegated decisionmaking process, any
thoughtful or careful exploration of the possibly unique needs of elec-
tronic discovery is basically nonexistent.
In a number of decisions, courts have employed their discretion-
ary authority to shift the costs of electronic discovery. For example, in
Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc.,64 the court required the plaintiff
to pay the cost of creating computer programs needed to extract rele-
vant data from the defendant’s computer system.65 For the most part,
however, the judiciary has expressed great reluctance to shift elec-
tronic discovery costs. Illustrative is the decision of the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois in In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Liti-
gation.66 In Brand Name, one of the defendants, CIBA, had sought,
among other things, to have the court order the class plaintiffs to bear
the costs of retrieving e-mail messages responsive to plaintiffs’ dis-
covery request.67 In rejecting this request, the court reasoned:
On the one hand, it seems unfair to force a party to bear the lofty
expense attendant to creating a special computer program for ex-
tracting data responsive to a discovery request. On the other hand, if
a party chooses an electronic storage method, the necessity for a re-
trieval program or method is an ordinary and foreseeable risk.68
63. See Giacobbe, supra note 61, at 281:
[One] reason for the inequitable decisions regarding the allocation of discovery costs
of electronically stored data is the insufficiency of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in addressing the issue. Critics maintain that the rules are too broad and require
substantial amendment to address more directly the changes in technology and their
impact on litigation.
See also Robins, supra note 19, at 473 (“In the area of cost-allocation . . . the guidance provided
by the rules is far less certain.”).
64. No. 94 Civ. 2120, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16355 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1995).
65. Id. at *8; see also Alexander v. FBI, 188 F.R.D. 111, 117 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that
the Executive Office of the President was not required to completely restore all deleted files
and e-mails because the resulting burden would have been excessive).
66. Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 997, 1995 WL 360526 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995).
67. Id. at *1.
68. Id. at *2.
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The court relied on the reasoning of an earlier decision, Daewoo
Electronics Co. v. United States,69 in which the Court of International
Trade concluded: “The normal and reasonable translation of elec-
tronic data into a form usable by the discovering party should be the
ordinary and foreseeable burden of a respondent in the absence of a
showing of extraordinary hardship.”70 The Daewoo court expressed
concern that “new techniques for easing the use of information
[might] bec[o]me a hindrance to discovery or disclosure in litigation,”
in a manner “inconsistent with the guiding principle that information
which is stored, used, or transmitted in new forms should be available
through discovery with the same openness as traditional forms.”71
It is hardly an overstatement to suggest that the reasoning in
Brand Name and Daewoo is seriously misguided. On technological,
practical, and theoretical levels, the decisions simultaneously over-
simplify complex concepts, ignore indisputable realities, and fail to
recognize the profound implications that would follow if their ration-
ale were widely followed.72
The decisions completely ignore the enormous technological dif-
ferences between electronic and traditional discovery. Recognition of
69. 650 F. Supp. 1003 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1986).
70. Id. at 1006.
71. Id. In Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459 (D. Utah 1985), the court, in denying the
defendant’s motion to shift the costs of electronic discovery, relied on four criteria:
 (1) The amount of money involved is not excessive or inordinate; (2) The relative
expense and burden in obtaining the data would be substantially greater to the re-
questing party as compared with the responding party; (3) The amount of money re-
quired to obtain the data as set forth by defendant would be a substantial burden to
the plaintiffs; (4) The responding party is benefited in its case to some degree by pro-
ducing the data in question.
Id. at 464. According to one commentator, “Bills provides an example of the typical manner in
which courts handle requests to shift the burden of discovery costs of electronically stored
data.” Giacobbe, supra note 61, at 274.
A similar decision is Sanders v. Levy, 558 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1977), rev’d on other
grounds sub nom. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978). The case was a class
action suit in which the class plaintiffs requested that the defendants produce a list of the names
and addresses of class members from its electronically stored records. Id. at 638. The informa-
tion was needed so that absent class members could be properly notified in accordance with the
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2). Id. The district court determined that
the discovery rules, not the class action rule, governed, and the court required the defendants to
shoulder the costs of retrieving and producing the requested information at an approximate cost
of $16,000. Id. at 641–42. The Second Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed, agreeing that Rule 34
controlled. Id. at 648. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the class action rule, rather
than the discovery rules, controlled. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 350–55
(1978). However, the Second Circuit decision remains valid precedent for the proposition that
when the discovery rules control, costs properly remain on the responding party.
72. See infra II.A.
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these important differences gives rise to two conclusions that must be
taken into account if the discovery system is to avoid a dramatic and
potentially harmful skewing impact on interests and relationships ex-
tending far beyond the courthouse walls. First, because of its unique
technological aspects, electronic discovery creates substantial practi-
cal difficulties that do not arise in the context of traditional discovery.
Second, the costs and burdens that result from these difficulties can
be of such a magnitude as to have a profound and unpredictable im-
pact on basic societal choices not directly involving the lawsuit. To ig-
nore these facts will not make them go away or strip them of socio-
economic impact; it will merely allow them to operate without public
recognition or systematic regulatory control.
Additionally, Brand Name and Daewoo improperly treat a com-
mercial defendant’s choice to employ a computer-based record-
keeping system as a voluntary act.73 Today it surely defies reality to
suggest that any viable commercial enterprise could operate success-
fully in the modern business world without relying heavily on elec-
tronically based methods of information storage and communication.
As commentators have correctly noted, “[t]he mushrooming of com-
puters in contemporary life has revolutionized the way we store in-
formation and communicate. Increasingly, electronic storage devices
have replaced paper document depositories. E-mail and the Internet
have begun to replace the telephone as the way people conduct daily
personal and business communications.”74 Because the decisions
largely premise the conclusion that a party must bear the costs of re-
sponding to its opponent’s discovery requests on the ground that this
cost is a natural consequence of the party’s voluntary commercial
73. See Brand Name, 1995 WL 360526, at *2 (stating that the plaintiff “should not be forced
to bear a burden caused by [the defendant’s] choice of electronic storage”); Daewoo, 650 F.
Supp. at 1006 (noting that “in the absence of a showing of extraordinary hardship,” the respon-
dent should reasonably foresee the burden of having to translate “electronic data into a form
useable by the discovering party”); see also Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., No. 97-2307, 1999 WL
462015, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 16, 1999) (citing Brand Name):
[T]his is one of the risks taken on by [big] companies which have made the decision to
avail themselves of the computer technology now available to the business world . . . .
To permit a corporation . . . to reap the business benefits of such technology and si-
multaneously use that technology as a shield in litigation would lead to incongruous
and unfair results.
74. Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 12, at 328; see also id. at 331–32 (“Electronic devices
have begun to replace paper as the primary means of storing information, just as the Internet
has begun to replace the postal system as the primary means of transmitting information.”).
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choices, and because this assumption is, without doubt, factually inac-
curate,75 the conclusion logically should be deemed suspect.
Of course, one might respond that regardless of whether a com-
mercial enterprise’s use of electronic storage and communications
systems is deemed voluntary, the consequences that flow from their
use are properly viewed as a cost of doing business that is properly at-
tributed to the enterprise. As a result, it is perfectly proper, in most
instances, to impose the full costs of discovery on responding parties,
who will then pass those costs on to their users or consumers. Indeed,
the argument could proceed, the costs of traditional discovery are
normally treated in exactly this manner, and there is no reason to
treat the costs of electronic discovery any differently.
It is true that the procedural system effectively treats an enter-
prise’s costs of responding to discovery as a cost of doing business,
though it appears to have done so unthinkingly and haphazardly. But
this argument ignores the fact that to say a particular expense is a cost
of doing business is not a reason for imposing a cost on an enterprise
but merely a conclusion that such a cost will be imposed. The ques-
tion that should be—but never has been—asked is whether it makes
sense, on moral, political, or economic grounds, to require that the
enterprise pass the particular cost onto its consumers and users. In
other words, society must decide whether the cost in question is prop-
erly to be attributed to the enterprise. At no point has society ever
consciously—much less thoughtfully or carefully—attempted to make
that decision about the costs of even traditional discovery. Such an ef-
fort would demonstrate that viewing discovery response costs as a
cost of doing business substantially and improperly skews fundamen-
tal substantive socioeconomic choices and threatens the goals of fair
and efficient adjudication.76 Although a strong argument could be
fashioned that even in the case of traditional discovery it is usually
improper to treat the costs of discovery response as a cost of doing
business, for reasons discussed below it is probably wiser to leave the
current system of cost allocation intact for traditional discovery.77
However, because the burdens and costs of electronic discovery are
likely to be—both quantitatively and qualitatively—of a very differ-
75. See Marcellino & Bongiorno, supra note 32, at B10 (noting that “[b]y characterizing
computer storage as a ‘choice,’ the [courts may be denying] the realities of modern business
practice”).
76. See infra Part III.B.
77. See infra Part IV.B.
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ent magnitude, it is necessary to develop different rules of cost alloca-
tion for its use.
The remainder of this Article is devoted to these issues. Before
one can understand the negative impact of the traditional cost alloca-
tion approach on electronic discovery, however, one first must grasp
the significant technological differences between electronically based
information storage and communications systems and traditional sys-
tems, and how those differences affect the nature of the discovery
process. Part II considers this issue. Part III then explores how tradi-
tional cost allocation methods subvert the meta-goals of the modern
procedural system.
II.  THE UNIQUENESS OF ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY
A. Technological Aspects of Electronic Discovery
Before one can fully comprehend the dramatic differences be-
tween electronic and traditional discovery, it is necessary to possess at
least a working knowledge of the essential technological elements of
the electronic information and communications systems that busi-
nesses and individuals employ. Many have made careers out of
studying the technological aspects of computer systems in merciless
detail. However, one need not be a computer expert to grasp the
unique discovery implications of electronic methods of information
storage, information acquisition, or communication.78 Rather, it is suf-
ficient that one understand merely the basics of the technology.
The types of electronic data widely sought in modern discovery
can be subdivided into three broad categories: (1) internally produced
document storage; (2) internal and external communications, com-
monly referred to as e-mail; and (3) Internet access. Each is examined
separately.
78. For excellent discussions of the technological aspects of electronic information and
communication systems written in a manner easily accessible to even the most technophobic
attorney, see generally GAHTAN, supra note 6; MICHAEL OVERLY, OVERLY ON ELECTRONIC
EVIDENCE IN CALIFORNIA (1999); Joan E. Feldman & Roger I. Kohn, The Essentials of Com-
puter Discovery, in ANNUAL INTERNET LAW INSTITUTE  51 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trade-
mark, & Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 564, 1999); Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra
note 12, at 333–36; Marnie H. Pulver, Note, Electronic Media Discovery: The Economic Benefit
of Pay-Per-View, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1379 (2000).
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1. Internally Produced Document Storage. For discovery pur-
poses, the electronic storage of internally produced documents can be
crudely analogized to a company’s or individual’s files containing
copies (formerly carbon copies, more recently photocopies) of written
material generated by that company or individual. In a sense, then, a
party seeking to discover electronically stored, internally produced
documents is analogous to a party seeking discovery of another liti-
gant’s paper copies of written documents. However, the analogy is
limited. The significant technological differences between the two
forms of storage have important implications for the discovery proc-
ess.
Unlike paper copies, electronically stored documents exist simul-
taneously on several very different levels of preservation. Five such
levels have been recognized: (1) active data; (2) replicant data; (3) ar-
chival (or “backup”) data; (4) residual data;79 and (5) “hidden” or
“embedded” data.80 “Active data” describes works-in-progress,
documents that are likely to change constantly. In addition to word
processing documents, the category includes spreadsheets, databases,
electronic calendars, and contact managers.81 “Replicant data” in-
cludes the most basic form of storage of a self-generated document on
the drafter’s hard drive. It is a form of inactive data sometimes de-
scribed as a “file clone.”82 It is designed to assist users in recovering
data losses caused by computer misuse or malfunction. If, for exam-
ple, a user by mistake turns off his computer without saving a word
processing file, he may be able to recover it if the computer has saved
a recent version as a “temporary file.”83 Because they are created
automatically, such file clones often exist without the knowledge of
their author. When the author seeks to delete the primary file, there-
fore, she is generally unaware that the deletion does not also purge
the file clone. Moreover, because the file is saved on the hard drive,
rather than on a centralized network, purging a document on the
network may not purge it from the creator’s hard drive. However, re-
trieval of replicant data may be substantially more difficult and ex-
pensive than retrieval of active data. “Retrieval of file clones requires
79. Feldman & Kohn, supra note 78, at 54–55; Pulver, supra note 78, at 1407–11.
80. Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 12, at 337–38.
81. Pulver, supra note 78, at 1407–08.
82. Id. at 1408.
83. Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 12, at 336–37.
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one to know where to look. Thus, it may be necessary for a party to
retain a computer expert to perform this operation.”84
Even though it is more difficult to retrieve than active data, rep-
licant data is easier to retrieve than either residual or backup data.85
“Backup” or “archival” data has been defined as “information copied
to removable media in order to provide users with access to data in
the event of a system failure.”86 Though such backup recordings are
used only rarely, they are a vital means to preserve documents in the
event of inadvertent erasure, computer malfunction, database corrup-
tion, or catastrophes such as fires, floods, or earthquakes.87 Thus, “a
copy of the information stored on the hard disk of most computer sys-
tems is usually backed up periodically on magnetic tape. Most organi-
zations have a formalized procedure to ensure that such backups are
made frequently at regular intervals . . . .”88 When a realistic fear of
natural disaster exists, many organizations move some or all of their
backup tapes to an off-site location for storage.89 Because backup
tapes are not organized in a manner that separates them by designa-
tion or subject matter, retrieval of a particular document is extremely
difficult.90 The system is designed to function only in the event of a
system catastrophe or natural disaster, in which event computer ex-
perts would be able to retrieve needed documents from the backup
tapes.
As necessary as such backup tapes are, if their discovery is not
carefully regulated it will give rise to potentially severe problems. In
institutions that produce a large volume of documents, permanent re-
tention of all backup tapes would quickly prove burdensome and un-
84. Pulver, supra note 78, at 1409.
85. Id.
86. Feldman & Kohn, supra note 78, at 54; see also Pulver, supra note 78, at 1382 n.17 (de-
fining “archival data” as “digital data that has been ‘backed-up’ by creating another copy of the
data for safe-keeping” and noting that “data [that] has been ‘deleted’ from a local or network
hard drive may continue to exist as archival data on a backup tape or CD-ROM”).
87. GAHTAN, supra note 6, at 52.
88. Id. at 50–51.
89. Id. at 52.
90. See Feldman & Kohn, supra note 78, at 55 (noting that finding relevant information on
backup tapes necessitates “restoring a tape, viewing its directories, and searching within the di-
rectories for specific files”); see also Pulver, supra note 78, at 1410 (noting that discovery of ar-
chival data is difficult because “backup [tapes] hold large amounts of virtually unorganized
data” and “[i]f the requested file is not on [the] tape [in question], the retriever will have to re-
peat [the] process for subsequent backup tapes, [a] process [that could] easily become . . . ex-
pensive and . . . time-consuming”).
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wieldy.91 Hence, most organizations use a regularized deletion system
that periodically and automatically writes over backup tapes con-
taining copies of documents that are no longer timely, thereby creat-
ing space for new backup copies.92 Individual users and small busi-
nesses may back up their computer storage devices by forwarding
their files over the Internet to a third party’s computer. Several com-
panies provide computer users free storage space on their websites.93
The fourth category, “residual data,” includes “information that
appears to be gone, but is still recoverable from the computer sys-
tem.”94 Such data is retrievable because a file that is “deleted” is not
always destroyed. When a user deletes a file, the computer makes
available for new files the space that is occupied by the deleted file.95
However, the deleted file is not altered physically until it is replaced
by a new file.96 Hence, deleted files that have not yet been “overwrit-
ten” can be recovered from the disk surface.97 Residual data has been
called the most costly form of data to recover, because it often re-
mains undetectable on disks and drives.98 Hence, to obtain this data
one often must employ forensic specialists who will use specialized
tools to examine the entire drive.99
Different from the other four categories of data is the fifth cate-
gory, “hidden” or “embedded” data. Unlike the other types of data,
91. See GAHTAN, supra note 6, at 51 (“Due to the growing volume of computer-readable
data many organizations are finding that . . . traditional backup techniques are no longer suffi-
cient to allow an entire backup to fit on a manageable number of tapes or to take place during
non-business hours.”).
92. See Heidi L. McNeil & Robert M. Kort, Discovery of E-Mail and Other Computerized
Information, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Apr. 1995, at 18:
Although most people view a computer as an organizational tool, the information
stored in a large company’s computer system is rarely organized in a coherent fash-
ion. Individual backup media are rarely catalogued, users often fail to organize data
files into subdirectories, and many companies fail to implement a formal retention
policy or destruction schedule for their computer records.
93. Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 12, at 336.
94. Feldman & Kohn, supra note 78, at 55.
95. Pulver, supra note 78, at 1411.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 1410–11 (explaining why “deleted files (or portions of those files) that have
not yet been overwritten can be recovered from the disk surface”).
98. Id. at 1411.
99. See id. (“Specialists utilize certain tools to examine the entire drive for important data
because neither simple copy commands, nor commercial backup programs, capture deleted files.
Stated otherwise, the forensic expert must create an image copy of the specific drive to retrieve
the requested information.”).
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embedded data is not consciously or unconsciously recorded by the
file creator. Rather,
[a]lmost all network operating software automatically records and
maintains information about the use of the system. These logs or
audit trails record information about when, where, and who accesses
the system. The level of detail can include the exact workstation at
which a user was working on a specified date and time.100
It is not difficult to understand why electronically created and
stored documents have rapidly become the subject of widespread and
intensive discovery. Electronic documents tend to remain on a com-
puter system well after similar paper records would be discarded, be-
cause there is no obvious pile of paper to remove. Moreover, because
of automatically operating backup procedures, prior versions may be
saved even though the file’s author did not actually intend to preserve
them. The availability of these prior versions can prove extremely
valuable, because
[o]lder versions of documents and designs can track the evolution of
a document and can be very revealing of decisions made during a
design process. . . . Older drafts may also provide a better insight
into the other party’s intentions than a final draft that was edited for
political correctness and legal considerations.101
Finally, the difficulty in truly deleting a file often means that more
documents exist than intended.102
2. E-Mail. E-mail programs usually store a copy of every mes-
sage the user has received or sent. As a result, multiple copies of a
particular e-mail message often are recorded on the computers of
both sender and receiver. This is true even if both have attempted to
delete the message. In addition to the contents of the message, the
computer will record the identity of the sender and the recipient and
the time the message was sent, received, and opened.103
100. OVERLY, supra note 78, § 2.09; see also Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 12, at 338 (ex-
plaining how network computer systems are structured and how they function).
101. GAHTAN, supra note 6, at 4 n.20.
102. Flanders et al., supra note 30, at 16.
103. See GAHTAN, supra note 6, at 60:
Facilities may be available in the e-mail system to purge these deleted messages and
recover the disk space being used by such files. However, the purging or compacting
facilities are usually only used periodically and usually only when disk space on the
drive containing the e-mail files is running out. . . . The old file may continue to exist
on the system in a deleted but recoverable state until the disk space it occupied is re-
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E-mail is among the most commonly requested forms of elec-
tronic discovery, for what should be obvious reasons.104 E-mail is often
used with a lack of appropriate caution, given its near-permanence—a
fact seldom realized by e-mail users, who think that when they trash a
message it is destroyed. Moreover, the distribution of e-mail messages
is largely impossible to control because they are so easily copied and
forwarded. Hence, e-mail often contains information that can prove
crucial in litigation.
3. Internet. A litigant may benefit strategically from gaining ac-
cess to records of an opponent’s use of the Internet. Computers gen-
erally record this type of information. First, web browsers usually re-
cord frequently visited websites on the computer’s hard drive in what
are called “cache files.”105 Computer users often are unaware of such
files’ existence, since the browser records them without an order to do
so by the user.106 Additionally, computers automatically create “his-
tory files,” which record both the websites visited by the user and the
duration of the visits.107 Finally, website operators generally keep their
own records of visitors to the site.108 These records are called website
“log files.”109
B. The Need for Special Treatment of Electronic Discovery
No one could reasonably dispute the fact that electronically
stored data can be tremendously important in litigation. Hence no
one seriously argues that electronically stored data is somehow ex-
empt from the discovery process. However, because of electronic dis-
quired to store new data. Therefore, e-mail information thought to be deleted perma-
nently, may still be recoverable . . . .
See also Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 12, at 339 (“[M]ultiple copies of an e-mail message are
often stored on the computer of both the sender and receiver—even if they are deleted by
both.”).
104. See generally Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 12 (discussing the most commonly used
forms of electronic evidence).
105. Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 12, at 340.
106. Id. (stating that computer users are often “unaware of the cache files stored on their
computers because they are stored by the browser without the users’ express approval”).
107. Id. at 347.
108. Id. at 340.
109. Id.; see also OVERLY, supra note 78, § 2.12 (explaining how “cookies” are installed on a
website visitor’s hard disk); Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 12, at 340 (describing “cookies” as
a “file generated by Web sites and stored on the computers of the users that access those Web
sites. . . . Cookies are a way of determining which Web sites the user had visited in the past”).
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covery’s unique technological aspects, those benefits often come at a
cost of a quantity and quality seldom seen in traditional discovery and
with a potentially dramatic impact beyond the scope of the litigation
process.110 The differences between electronic and traditional discov-
ery can be divided into three categories: (1) volume; (2) retrieval; and
(3) translation. As a result of these differences, one is able to predict
that the costs and burdens that electronic discovery imposes are likely
to be substantially greater than the costs and burdens imposed by tra-
ditional discovery.
1. Volume. For a variety of reasons, it is not difficult to predict
that in the majority of cases, discovery of electronically stored data
will result in a geometric increase in the number of documents pro-
duced. Simply put, “electronic storage of information means there is
far more to discover.”111 Indeed, it would be difficult to dispute the
fact that “[c]omputer technology has produced a society in which in-
formation is constantly demanded, created, transmitted and digested
in quantities that would have been unthinkable twenty-five years
ago,”112 and “the concomitant increase in computer data storage ca-
pacity has exponentially inflated the universe of discoverable infor-
mation.”113
The dramatic increase in discoverable material derives in part
from the technological ease with which electronically stored docu-
ments may proliferate. Electronic documents are likely to be stored in
more locations, to be distributed to a wider audience, and to have
more prior drafts retained than would paper documents.114 Equally
110. For a detailed discussion of the nature of this impact, see infra Part III.B.
111. Bruce Rubenstein, Somebody Destroyed the Evidence: Corporate Law Department
Stung by Mishandled E-Mail, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 1997, at 1.
112. Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 12, at 366; see also id. at 349 (noting that “the volume
of electronic evidence maintained by a party can be staggering”).
113. Id. at 367; see also GAHTAN, supra note 6, at 3 (“Information technologies, including e-
mail, have led to the unprecedented proliferation and retention of large quantities of informa-
tion. In the event of litigation, this can impose an extraordinary burden on the possessor.”);
Geanne Rosenberg, Electronic Discovery Proves Effective Legal Weapon, J. REC. (Oklahoma
City), Apr. 21, 1997 (“While deleted e-mail may draw some lawyers to computer-based informa-
tion, experts say that the sheer volume of stored electronic data has had the biggest impact upon
commercial cases.”).
114. See GAHTAN, supra note 6, at 8 (emphasizing the ease with which electronic documents
may proliferate); Solovy & Byman, supra note 1, at A16:
In the old days, the responsive documents were, mostly, physical pieces of paper, kept
in a finite number of locations. In those good old days, you would go to a few key
employees and say, “Here are the document requests. Search your files and give me
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important are the mind-boggling differences in storage capacity cre-
ated by electronic technology. Magnetic backup tapes can retain stag-
gering amounts of data. For example, one eight-millimeter backup
tape can hold as much information as 1500 boxes of paper.115 Thus, it
should not be surprising that in one case a defendant that had a policy
of retaining all of its electronically stored data reportedly incurred
costs in excess of three million dollars responding to a discovery re-
quest.116 In another case, according to reports, a court required the de-
fendant to search 50,000 backup tapes at a cost of more than one mil-
lion dollars.117 While these are only individual examples that may or
may not reflect a developing pattern of discovery expense, it is rea-
sonable to believe that the sheer volume of electronically stored data
will continue to increase dramatically the costs and burdens of elec-
tronic discovery relative to traditional paper discovery.118
2. Retrieval. As Part II demonstrated, modern technology rec-
ords electronic documents in many different ways and in a variety of
versions. Retrieval of those alternate copies or versions is often ex-
tremely difficult and expensive. The expense derives from the fact
that retrieval of stored data—whether archival, residual, or repli-
cant—often will require the retention of high-priced forensic ex-
perts.119
anything responsive.” That won’t do today. You can’t limit the search to a few, be-
cause in the digital age, information is shared by the many.
115. Giacobbe, supra note 61, at 263.
116. Id. at 258; Rosenberg, supra note 113.
117. Janet Novack, Control/Alt/Discover, FORBES, Jan. 13, 1997, at 60.
118. See Giacobbe, supra note 61, at 265 (“[C]ommentators have reported numerous in-
stances in which plaintiffs have presented defendants with electronic data discovery requests
with which compliance would cost approximately a million dollars or more.”); Bruce Ruben-
stein, Electronic Discovery Costs Are Leveraging Settlements, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 1997,
at 26 (“Litigants routinely run up bills of $100,000 identifying, locating, and copying computer-
ized data, and seven-figure price tags are not unheard of.”).
119. See Cendali & Zaidman, supra note 12, at 910:
Many law firms, accounting firms, investigative firms and computer experts specifi-
cally advertise their ability to find “hidden” data on hard drives and backup tapes that
a non-technically trained lay person might not know how to access. Forensic experts
are costly, but they can often obtain information that would otherwise be unobtain-
able.
See also Giacobbe, supra note 61, at 259 (describing the “extremely technical and exceedingly
expensive process” involved in retrieving electronically stored data); id. at 265 (“Although some
companies specialize in discovery of electronically stored data, their services are extremely
costly.”); Novack, supra note 117, at 60 (explaining how defendant companies have to spend
long hours and lots of money to retrieve and sort electronic data to comply with discovery re-
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One might think that a responding party could avoid costs simply
by giving the discovering party access to its data storage system,
thereby enabling that party to obtain the information on its own.
When retrieval will be very costly, however, it is highly doubtful that
a court will find this a satisfactory alternative.120 In any event, provid-
ing an opponent access to one’s private electronic storage facilities is
not likely to be a viable option for most litigants. The differences be-
tween the retrieval of electronically stored documents for purposes of
discovery and the retrieval of traditionally stored paper documents
for purposes of discovery, then, are obvious and significant. This is
true of both internally created documents and e-mail messages.121
3. Translation. Expert estimates indicate that as much as thirty-
five percent of electronically stored data have never been trans-
formed into paper form.122 Thus, unlike discovery of traditional paper
documents, discovery of electronically stored data will require physi-
cal creation as an essential part of production—such documents must
be printed onto paper. Moreover, even where a litigant is willing to
produce electronically stored data in paper form, a discovering party
may seek the data in electronic form.123
Upon amending Rule 34 in 1970, the Advisory Committee noted
that “when the data can as a practical matter be made usable by the
quests); Rosenberg, supra note 113 (explaining how the costs of electronic discovery can spiral
out of control); Solovy & Byman, supra note 1, at A16:
[M]ere business executives cannot be asked to search their computer files because
they likely do not know how to. The documents reside in nooks and crannies of their
computers and in network archives. In order to legitimately comply with most mod-
ern discovery requests, it is necessary to involve a management information systems
(MIS) manager, so that you have an understanding of how data are kept, maintained,
archived and retrieved.
120. See Pulver, supra note 78, at 1386:
Cost-saving options that are available with traditional document production are not
available with [electronic discovery]. Parties are able to shift the majority of costs of
traditional document production to the requesting party by making the records avail-
able to the requesting party and having that party search for pertinent information.
With [electronic discovery], this technique is no longer available, as parties lack the
expertise to search another party’s database for pertinent information.
121. See GAHTAN, supra note 6, at 7 (“A review of a paper document is simply a matter of
reading. An electronic document, on the other hand, may have been stored in any one of hun-
dreds of different formats.”).
122. Id. at 4 n.18.
123. See Giacobbe, supra note 61, at 262 (noting that “[e]ven though many companies and
individuals continue to store paper copies of various documents, it is important to recognize that
even if a litigant properly makes the information available to the requesting party in paper form,
an adversary still can demand the same information in a usable electronic format”).
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discovering party only through respondent’s devices, respondent may
be required to use his devices to translate the data into usable
form.”124
Although the Committee stated that production usually will re-
quire a “printout of computer data,” today it could conceivably re-
quire the design and installation of a computer program to extract the
necessary information.125 Certainly, the additional costs associated
with translation never occur in traditional discovery.
III.  PLACING DISCOVERY WITHIN THE LITIGATION MATRIX
To this point, this analysis has sought to establish that, due to
fundamental technological differences, electronic discovery can be
predicted, as a general matter, to give rise to burdens and expense
that are of a completely different magnitude from those encountered
in traditional discovery. Common sense would seem to dictate, then,
that one at least consider the possibility that the standards for judicial
control of electronic discovery should differ from the standards for
judicial control of traditional discovery. Indeed, many commentators
who have considered the question have come to this conclusion,126 and
at least one state, Texas, has chosen to alter its procedural rules in the
case of electronic discovery.127 Yet to this point, at least, there appears
to have been little movement at the federal level toward such an al-
teration.128
124. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note (1970).
125. See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 2120, 1996 WL 22976, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (requiring the plaintiff to pay discovery costs for “special programming” to ex-
tract data from the defendant’s files); see also Giacobbe, supra note 61, at 262 (“A requirement
that the date be in electronic form also increases the cost of discovery because production often
can entail creating complex computer programs to convert the electronic data from its current
format to an electronic format that the requesting party can use.”). But see Munoz-Santana v.
U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 742 F.2d 561, 562–64 (9th Cir. 1984) (refusing to order
alterations or improvements in information management software to produce data in the re-
quested formats).
126. See, e.g., supra note 63 and accompanying text.
127. TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4.
128. The Advisory Committee, it is true, has begun to consider the question. Electronic dis-
covery was discussed extensively at the Committee’s October 1999 meeting in Kennebunkport,
Maine. Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Judicial Conference of the United States 23–
28 (Oct. 14–15, 1999), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/1099mnCV.pdf. At
that meeting, the Committee decided to refer the matter to the Discovery Subcommittee. Id. at
28. However, there is as of yet no indication of any movement toward the adoption of special
treatment for electronic discovery.
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Perhaps the lack of progress can be explained by the intermedi-
ate analytical mode that has dominated the debate. At no point has
any commentator attempted to explore carefully the implications of
the normative first principles underlying the modern procedural sys-
tem for the control of electronic discovery. Such an inquiry reveals
that many of the harms feared to flow from added controls of elec-
tronic discovery are not as dangerous to the intersecting set of values
underlying the adjudicatory structure as widely assumed and that the
harms that flow from the failure to treat electronic discovery specially
are considerably more severe than many seem to believe. To fully
comprehend why the quantitative and qualitative differences between
electronic and traditional discovery justify distinctive treatment in the
courts, then, one needs to add another level of analysis, one grounded
in the deep normative structure of procedure. By adding this missing
link, one is able to understand why these differences call for distinc-
tive treatment, because by exploring modern procedure’s deep nor-
mative structure, one can best understand how the added burdens as-
sociated with electronic discovery threaten the procedural system’s
underlying social, political, and economic goals.
This Part is designed to explore two different aspects of this deep
structural inquiry. First, it seeks to determine the specific normative
goals that the modern procedural system should foster and to explore
how these different goals interact. Second, it considers the implica-
tions of the normative litigation matrix for the judicial regulation of
discovery in general and electronic discovery in particular.
A. Formulating the Content of the Litigation Matrix: The Meta-Goals
of the Modern Procedural System
Nowhere does there exist an officially adopted set of normative
goals that modern procedure is designed to achieve.129 Yet if one stops
to think about the issue on an abstract level and to draw on the pre-
cepts embedded in well-established procedural values and traditions,
it is not difficult to identify a rough consensus concerning the group-
ing of meta-goals that combine to make up the matrix of normative
precepts underlying the litigation system. Some of these goals are af-
firmative, goals the procedural system should accomplish. Others are
129. Although Rule 1 states that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “shall be construed
and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action,” the
Rule is phrased in general terms that do not provide a specific set of normative goals to be
achieved. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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negative, goals that attempt to limit the dangers to which the proce-
dural system may give rise. Although one could reasonably synthesize
and conceptualize these goals under different headings, it is, I believe,
proper to glean from American society’s procedural traditions and
judicial doctrine six foundational goals: (1) decisionmaking accuracy;
(2) adjudicatory efficiency; (3) political legitimacy; (4) maintenance of
the substantive-procedural balance; (5) predictability; and (6) funda-
mental fairness.
The goal of decisionmaking accuracy is so ingrained in the
American psyche that it is easy to view it as an end in itself.130 Closer
examination, however, reveals that this goal is actually a means to
other normative ends. Absent an approximation of factual accuracy in
the decisions made by the adjudicatory system, it would be all but im-
possible to accomplish virtually any of the moral, social, or economic
goals that the rules of substantive law seek to achieve in individual
cases. It is quite probably for this reason that the goal of factual accu-
racy has been described as an “instrumental” concern.131 As my col-
league Robert Burns writes, “[f]actual accuracy is clearly important to
those who defend the Rule of Law on substantive grounds. . . . The
condition to be fulfilled for the application of the law is factual, and
substantive justice will be achieved if the facts are found accu-
rately.”132 Philosopher John Rawls articulates the point:
If laws are directives addressed to rational persons for their guid-
ance, courts must be concerned to apply and to enforce these rules
in an appropriate way. A conscientious effort must be made to de-
termine whether an infraction has taken place and to impose the
correct penalty. Thus a legal system . . . must contain rules of evi-
dence that guarantee rational procedures of inquiry. . . . [T]he rule
130. Consider, for example, the following statement by one commentator:
Accuracy in fact finding is achieved when the decisionmaker’s inferences are as close
as possible to actual events. Of course, a fact-finder . . . can never know with certainty
whether he or she has fully captured the relevant reality. The best one can do is to
devise and employ procedures which, within available resources, foster the identifica-
tion of relevant issues, the gathering and effective presentation of evidence pertaining
to these issues, the testing of evidence for indicia of reliability, and the application of
sound logic to the drawing of inferences.
John R. Allison, Ideology, Prejudgment, and Process Values, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 657, 673–74
(1994).
131. “According to the instrumental conception of due process, the purpose of the clause is
to ensure the most accurate decision possible.” Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Ad-
judicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 476
(1986).
132. ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 13 (1999).
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of law requires some form of due process: that is, a process reasona-
bly designed to ascertain the truth, in ways consistent with the other
ends of the legal system, as to whether a violation has taken place
and under what circumstances.133
This instrumental connection between means and ends links the
concern about factual accuracy with the goal of maintaining political
accountability. If the facts are not found accurately in an individual
case, the general value choices embodied in governing substantive law
will not be achieved, in effect skewing the governing substantive law.
As I argue elsewhere,
Use of procedures that have the effect of skewing the applicable
substantive law subvert the democratic process by altering the gov-
erning law without informing the electorate that that law has been
changed. That procedural alteration without a corresponding formal
alteration in the substantive law is equivalent to the commission of a
fraud on the electorate.134
As significant as the goals of factual accuracy and political le-
gitimacy are within the litigation matrix, it is also necessary to recog-
nize additional—and sometimes competing—socioeconomic goals.
Factual accuracy is not an end that must be achieved regardless of the
costs. And there is no doubt that in a number of situations the pursuit
of factual accuracy will give rise to potentially significant—and pro-
hibitive—costs. Those costs may take two different forms that can be
described as “internal” and “external” costs. “Internal” costs include
the socioeconomic burdens to which the truth-finding process directly
gives rise. In shaping the litigation matrix one must take into account
the economic and physical drain that the truth-finding process im-
poses. Simply put, one must ask how time-consuming and expensive it
will be to guarantee that the process actually finds the truth in a par-
ticularized dispute. Any adjudicatory structure fashioned to further
utilitarian-based concerns of efficiency will place a good deal of
weight on such considerations in shaping its procedural calculus.
In structuring the standards of procedural due process that now
control in civil cases, the Supreme Court expressly has chosen to
adopt such a utilitarian, cost-attentive concern. Under that standard,
133. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 238–39 (1972).
134. Martin H. Redish, Procedural Due Process and Aggregation Devices in Mass Tort Liti-
gation, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 18, 22 (1996).
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adopted in Mathews v. Eldridge,135 in deciding whether due process
dictates the use of a particular procedure in civil cases, the Court con-
siders the following factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official ac-
tion; second the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substi-
tute procedural requirement would entail.136
Applying the standard in the case before it, the Court held that
due process did not require an evidentiary hearing in a challenge to
the Social Security Administration’s termination of the plaintiff’s dis-
ability benefits.137 Thus, the administrative and economic burdens
caused by use of a particular procedure may justify the refusal to em-
ploy that procedure, even if its use would advance the truth-finding
process; it is only if a synthesis of the importance of the private inter-
ests at stake and the risk that failure to use the procedure will lead to
an erroneous conclusion are found to outweigh the added costs and
burdens that the procedure’s use will be deemed constitutionally re-
quired.
The utilitarian approach to procedural due process has often
been attacked by commentators.138 It has been criticized because “the
test requires subjective and impressionistic evaluations, asking ques-
tions that can only be answered with ‘pervasive indeterminacies.’
Ranking degrees of deprivation to determine the weight of a private
interest is inherently subjective.”139 But much the same could be said
of virtually any constitutional test that seeks to reconcile competing
interests. To be sure, if applied without any concern for litigant dig-
nity, the test risks undermining important constitutional values.140 But
especially in a suit between private individuals or entities, fashioning
135. 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see also Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11–18 (1991) (applying
and modifying Mathews’ utilitarian calculus in civil suits between private parties).
136. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
137. Id. at 339–49.
138. See, e.g., Jerry Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory,
61 B.U. L. REV. 885, 910–12 (1981) (criticizing utilitarian approaches to due process by critiqu-
ing their views on individual rights).
139. Linda Beale, Connecticut v. Doehr and Procedural Due Process Values: The Sniadach
Tetrad Revisited, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1603, 1642–43 (1994).
140. See Redish & Marshall, supra note 131, at 472–74.
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procedures without any serious concern for the avoidance of eco-
nomic waste and the attainment of economic efficiency inexcusably
drains society’s resources and violates the dignity of the litigants
whose personal resources are unduly affected.
The goal of accuracy in decisionmaking, then, is not sacrosanct.
The procedural system may, under appropriate circumstances, openly
exclude procedures that might promote truth-finding when the re-
sulting costs and burdens are deemed too great. “Internal” costs are
those the procedural system itself feels acutely. In Mathews, for ex-
ample, the Court found that the burdens of time, effort, and expense
resulting from the holding of an evidentiary hearing were not justified
by whatever advance toward truth such a hearing would add, meas-
ured in light of the importance of the private interest at stake.141 When
a dispute is between private parties, the Court will consider the costs
and burdens that use of a procedure might have on other parties.142
The goals of the procedural system therefore include the desire to
adopt the most efficient and economical means of truth-finding.143
Using procedures that do not advance the search for truth more than
less expensive or burdensome procedures wastes the resources of
government, society, and private entities and cannot be tolerated.
However, even procedures that uniquely add to the effectiveness of
the fact-finding process may be rejected if they are found not to be
justified by their costs or burdens.
Unlike internal costs, “external” costs are losses incurred by so-
ciety external to the process of administering civil justice. In certain
instances use of a particular procedure will impose costs beyond the
four walls of the courtroom by undermining substantive interests that
society has chosen to value or protect. For example, evidentiary tes-
timonial privileges were not adopted because society has concluded
that their imposition will advance the truth-finding process. Indeed,
such testimonial privileges—for example, husband-wife, doctor-
patient, and priest-penitent privileges—usually will have just the op-
posite effect, because they deprive the fact-finder of possibly proba-
tive information. Nevertheless, society has chosen to deprive the fact-
finding process of this potentially valuable information to promote
141. 425 U.S. at 348.
142. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11 (1991).
143. See Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex Liti-
gation, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 440, 452–53 (1986) (referring to the “interest in economy—the costs
to the courts, parties and society in dollars and time”).
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openness in relationships, a goal wholly unrelated to the fair and effi-
cient operation of the adjudicatory system. Privileges are concerned,
rather, with values that affect citizens in their everyday lives.
Such external costs link the meta-goals of utilitarian truth-finding
with the fourth meta-goal, what I describe as maintenance of the sub-
stantive-procedural balance. The concern derives from the recogni-
tion that procedural rules often will have an inherent and inescapable
spillover onto nonprocedural interests and that to ignore such sub-
stantive consequences will not prevent them; it merely will allow
them to occur without any regulation or societal control. On occasion,
recognition of the substantive-procedural intersection has led courts
and legislatures to adopt particular procedures for the very reason
that they will have a desired impact beyond the courthouse walls. For
example, the Supreme Court consciously has chosen to modify prin-
ciples of substantive law because it recognized that absent such modi-
fications, application of governing procedural rules would have an
unacceptable impact on nonprocedural interests that society wishes to
protect.144
At various points in its development, the Erie doctrine,145 which
determines whether federal courts, sitting in diversity, will employ
federal law or the law of the state in which they sit, has focused upon
the substantive-procedural intersection.146 In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Electric Cooperative,147 for example, the Court employed a balancing
test, contrasting the federal judicial system’s procedural interest in
using its own processes against the state’s interest in having the fed-
eral court employ the state’s procedures when enforcing substantive
state law.148 The Court focused its inquiry in part on the extent to
which the state’s procedure was “bound up” with the underlying sub-
stantive law being enforced.149 In other words, the Court sought to de-
termine whether use of a particular procedural standard affected
nonprocedural interests. It thus took into account the nature of the
substantive-procedural interaction. Ultimately, under the framework
of the litigation matrix, it is not only appropriate but also essential
144. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1982) (refining the subjective good
faith requirement for the immunity defense in civil rights suits to facilitate the entry of summary
judgments).
145. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
146. Id. at 78–79.
147. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
148. Id. at 537.
149. Id. at 535–36.
REDISH.DOC 01/25/02 3:26 PM
2001] ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 599
that those responsible for shaping procedures take into account how
particular procedural choices will affect citizens’ behavior beyond the
scope of the litigation.
Just as the substantive-procedural interaction in part results from
some elements of the litigation matrix, other elements of the matrix
logically derive from recognition of the interaction. The concern for
predictability in a sense flows out of the commitment to maintain the
substantive-procedural balance, because it acknowledges that proce-
dural rules may affect how individuals and entities shape their non-
litigation behavior—what scholars and jurists refer to as “primary
conduct.”150 Although the substantive-procedural interaction is con-
cerned with the general impact of procedural rules on the shaping of
primary conduct, the goal of predictability focuses solely on the con-
cern that potential litigants receive clear and consistent messages as
to how they should plan their daily lives. In the case of corporate enti-
ties, the concern is that corporations be given a reasonable under-
standing of what will be expected of them in the course of litigation so
that they may plan their primary conduct accordingly. As Henry Hart
once warned, “[p]eople repeatedly subjected, like Pavlov’s dogs, to
two or more inconsistent sets of directions, without means of resolv-
ing the inconsistencies, could not fail in the end to react as the dogs
did. The society, collectively, would suffer a nervous breakdown.”151
To avoid this “debilitating uncertainty,”152 then, where it can be
reasonably predicted that procedural rules will have an impact on
how individuals or commercial entities shape their primary conduct, it
is necessary—to the extent feasible—to develop governing rules that
provide the litigants with a clear understanding of what is expected of
them.
The final element of the litigation matrix is left for last, perhaps
because it is so intertwined within the deep structure of modern pro-
cedure that it can almost be assumed. It is the concern with funda-
mental fairness. Although on occasion perhaps difficult to operation-
150. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (referring to
“the primary activity of citizens” and noting that people will face “debilitating uncertainty in the
planning of everyday affairs” if the controlling legal rules are unclear); Henry Hart, The Rela-
tions Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 489–90 (1954) (referring to “pri-
vate activity” and arguing that government action through lawmaking changes the way people
collaborate); see also REDISH, supra note 18, at 231 (concluding that discrepancies between fed-
eral and state law can confuse the public’s planning of future conduct).
151. Hart, supra note 150, at 489.
152. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 474 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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alize, the fundamental fairness concern permeates all other elements
of the matrix. It is grounded in the social contract implicit in Ameri-
can constitutional democracy, whereby government agrees to treat its
citizens with dignity and respect.153 Recognition of these dignitary val-
ues extends beyond a narrow utilitarian concern for efficiency and ac-
curacy. Rather, it demands that the processes employed provide pri-
vate litigants with a sense of participation and self-worth.
B. The Litigation Matrix and the Dilemma of Modern Discovery
The introduction of widespread discovery in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in 1938 was criticized at the time.154 Nevertheless, it
would be difficult to deny that, in at least a range of cases where key
evidence is likely to lie in the hands of others, discovery has had a
dramatic impact on the success of the truth-finding process. Indeed,
respected commentators write glowingly of its benefits,155 and the Su-
preme Court acknowledged its important role in modern litigation
theory.156 In this sense, the discovery concept—at least in the ab-
stract—does much to move the procedural system toward attainment
of the goals embodied in the litigation matrix: It aids in achieving fac-
tual accuracy and, in doing so, may significantly facilitate the en-
forcement of governing substantive law. Moreover, it may advance
the dignitary goals of the matrix by giving litigants a sense of
empowerment in the fact-finding process.
153. For a discussion of these “dignitary” values in the procedural context, see generally
Mashaw, supra note 138; Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural
Due Process, in DUE PROCESS 126 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977).
154. See Subrin, supra note 2, at 720 (“Some members of the Advisory Committee had deep
concerns about the problems inherent in liberal discovery . . . .”).
155. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2239 (1989) (“[D]ocument discovery
is . . . a vital disclosure mechanism . . . .”); Marcus, supra note 36, at 749 (“It seems undeniable
that broad discovery has benefitted plaintiffs attempting to prove certain types of claims by
enabling them to obtain both ‘smoking guns’ and less inflammatory but critical evidence. The
great importance of discovery to some plaintiffs is obvious.”); Subrin, supra note 2, at 697 (“It is
probable that no procedural process offers greater opportunities for increasing the efficiency of
the administration of justice than that of discovery before trial.”).
156. See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957) (enforcing lax notice pleading
rules in a civil rights conspiracy suit, where the plaintiffs needed opportunity to have access to
discovery devices); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (“No longer can the time-
honored cry of ‘fishing expedition’ serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts un-
derlying his opponent’s case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both par-
ties is essential to proper litigation.”).
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It would be dangerous folly, however, to view the discovery pro-
cess through rose-colored lenses. While discovery does not appear to
cause significant problems in most ordinary litigation,157 as presently
structured it may well have serious negative effects on attainment of
the goals of the litigation matrix in many cases. Indeed, on at least
four occasions in the last twenty years, the Advisory Committee has
dramatically altered the Federal Rules to deal with continued prob-
lems of discovery control. My goal here is not to reexamine all of the
arguments about the scope, extent, and sources of discovery abuse in
modern litigation.158 My goal, rather, is to focus more on what can be
described as “the discovery problem,” which is by no means identical
to the concept of discovery abuse. To understand the difference, it is
necessary first to define the concept of discovery “abuse.” One com-
mentator defines the concept as “behavior motivated by goals other
than the exchange of information fairly related to the issues in dis-
pute.”159 Discovery abuse, then, is discovery designed “to force favor-
157. See Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research on Civil Discov-
ery, 39 B.C. L. REV. 785, 800 (1998) (“In the vast majority of cases, discovery appears to be the
self-executing system the rules contemplate.”); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Giving the ‘Haves’ a
Little More: Considering the 1998 Discovery Proposals, 52 SMU L. REV. 229, 259 (1999) (“Em-
pirical research has demonstrated time and again that the ordinary cases have few discovery
disputes and work well.”).
158. According to one group of commentators, “[o]bservers of the civil justice system differ
in their assessments of the nature and amount of problem discovery. Attorneys, judges, litigants,
rulemakers, researchers and others may all have different perceptions of what is proper discov-
ery, what is legitimate but problematic discovery and what is abusive discovery.” McKenna &
Wiggins, supra note 157, at 799.
159. Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Discovery Abuse Revisited: Some Specific Proposals to Amend the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 189, 193 (1992); see Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975) (noting that discovery requests are sometimes used
to extract larger settlements). But see supra note 155 and accompanying text (citing commenta-
tors who speak of the benefits of modern discovery).
Professor Mullenix challenges the empirical validity of the traditional assumption that
discovery is widely abused, asserting that “[t]here is no strong evidence documenting the alleged
massive discovery abuse in the federal courts.” Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The
Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemak-
ing, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1393 (1994). She asserts that the myth is the result of “inadequate
soft social science” and the lack of “hard” social science. Id. at 1410. However, never has the
need for procedural modification been premised on a requirement of “hard” social science data
to support widely held empirical perceptions premised on widespread anecdotal and experien-
tial assessments. Professor Mullenix provides no evidence—“hard” or “soft”—that widespread
discovery abuse does not exist. The most she can establish, then, is that the claim has not been
“proven” in a sufficiently scientific method—a preposterously unrealistic standard on which to
measure the need for procedural modification that irrationally imposes an all-but-irrebuttable
presumption in favor of the status quo. In any event, the analysis that follows proceeds not on
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able settlements by driving up the other party’s discovery costs be-
yond the case’s value, calculated in terms of the likelihood of a favor-
able outcome, the value of such an outcome, and the cost of litigating
the case to conclusion.”160 Abusive discovery costs are to be con-
trasted with the “inherent” costs of nonabusive discovery. Even dis-
covery that does not fall within the definition of “abusive” discovery
gives rise to costs and, in a more complex case, those costs are likely
to be substantial. Even were it feasible to prevent all abusive discov-
ery costs—an all-but-impossible task161—the costs inherent in discov-
ery would be inescapable.
In a number of ways, the abusive and inherent costs may become
intertwined in a hybrid category. This hybrid category may be de-
scribed as “excessive” discovery costs. It shares aspects of the first
two categories, in that, like nonabusive discovery, it can be presumed
not to derive from any motivation on the part of the discovering party
other than to gain information related to the case but, like abusive
discovery costs, it includes costs that are not—on an objective basis—
necessary to the fair and accurate adjudication of the case. What links
the categories of abusive and excessive costs together is the concept
of externality, defined as “a cost or benefit resulting from a decision-
maker’s activity that does not accrue to the decisionmaker and is thus
‘external’ to his decisionmaking process.”162 Discovery requests give
rise to externalities under the current system for the simple reason
that the discovering party is not normally required to pay the often
significant costs of assembling material in response to the request.163
an assumption that discovery is “abused,” but merely on the assumption that excessive discov-
ery costs bring about externalities that plague the current discovery system.
160. Dudley, supra note 159, at 194.
161. According to Judge Easterbrook,
[t]he difficulty [with proposals to penalize the abuse of discovery] is that in a
world in which everything is relevant and no one knows what lies in the adver-
sary’s bosom, it is impossible for outsiders accurately to identify impositional
discovery requests, if indeed the lawyers can tell the difference. What you can-
not detect, you cannot single out for sanctions.
Easterbrook, supra note 36, at 642. He notes that “many lawyers do not know whether their
own discovery requests are proper or impositional; it is almost impossible to tell one from the
other, and both are in the interest of the lawyer’s client.” Id. at 641; see also Dudley, supra note
159, at 195 (“Identifying abusive behavior in individual cases is often difficult.”).
162. John K. Setear, Note, Discovery Abuse Under the Federal Rules: Causes and Cures, 92
YALE L.J. 352, 352 n.5 (1982).
163. See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reforming The New Discovery Rules, 84
GEO. L.J. 61, 65 (1995) (“Two factors greatly reduce the costs of discovery to the requesting
party. First, requesting information costs little compared to the cost of compliance. Second, un-
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Thus, the cost associated with the request is generally not a relevant
factor in a party’s decision to make a particular discovery request.
Hence, a party will not be dissuaded from making a discovery request
on the ground that the likelihood of producing valuable information
is relatively low, because he effectively has nothing to lose. In the
words of two respected legal economists, “the rational requesting
party will request information that increases the expected value of her
legal claim by a little, even though compliance costs the other party a
lot.”164 Indeed, the fact that a party’s opponent will have to bear the
financial burden of preparing the discovery response actually gives
litigants an incentive to make discovery requests, and the bigger the
expense to be borne by the opponent, the bigger the incentive to
make the request.165 It is, then, all but inevitable that this externality—
indeed, the perverse economic incentive—created by the current cost
allocation system will result in excessive and therefore inefficient dis-
covery even where the discovering party does not consciously intend
the discovery to be abusive.
It should not take much effort to see how excessive discovery
contravenes the goals embodied in the litigation matrix. Its obvious
and inherent inefficiency violates all of the utilitarian ends that the
matrix seeks to foster. Moreover, it would be difficult to conclude
that any of the measures adopted by the rules’ drafters to date have
adequately dealt with the problem. For example, the addition in 1983
of Rule 26(b)(2), directing the court to limit “[t]he frequency or ex-
tent of use of the discovery methods” where “the burden or expense
of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into ac-
count the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’
resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and
the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues”166
has proven to be of little help167 for what should be obvious reasons.
der the current rules of civil procedure, the complying party pays part or all of the cost of com-
plying with the discovery request.”).
164. Id.
165. See Setear, supra note 162, at 353 (“The current allocation of legal fees between the
litigants combines with the rules governing discovery to allow a litigant to increase his oppo-
nent’s costs of litigation.”). To be sure, the arguments fashioned here potentially apply to tradi-
tional discovery, as well as to electronic discovery. For reasons to be discussed, however, it
makes more sense to confine the remedy to cases of electronic discovery. See infra notes 175–76
and accompanying text.
166. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2).
167. In adding what it conceded to be an “otherwise redundant cross-reference” to Rule
26(b)(1), the Advisory Committee in its 2000 amendments inserted a sentence “calling attention
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First, it is difficult for a court to determine, on any objective basis,
whether discovery will prove helpful without knowing what informa-
tion is actually contained in the material sought to be discovered.
Second, at the discovery stage it often will not be clear what the ac-
tual—as opposed to asserted—amount in controversy is. Third, a de-
termination of the “importance of the issues at stake” is so subjective
a judgment that a court normally should not be allowed to make it for
a litigant. Simply put, an issue that does not seem “important” to a
judge may be very important to a litigant.
Of greater (though perhaps not as readily obvious) significance
than the likely excessiveness of discovery flowing from the external-
ities of the discovery process is the harmful skewing impact that even
the “inherent” costs of legitimate discovery may impose. Even under
the current discovery system, which almost appears to have been
structured to invite the creation of externalities, discovery requests
will be made that, though costly, would be accepted by any objective
observer as totally proper and necessary to the effective performance
of the truth-finding process. Even under the nebulous balancing proc-
ess of Rule 26(b)(2), one can presume that the legitimacy of the re-
quest would be clear. The fact remains that in such cases, imposing
the costs of the discovery on the responding party is likely to have far-
reaching effects both within and beyond the courthouse walls. This is
particularly true where the responding party is both a defendant and
a commercial enterprise. In such a case, the cost of preparing a dis-
covery response is widely deemed a mere cost of doing business.168
The way a commercial enterprise normally deals with a cost of
doing business is to pass that cost onto its users or consumers within
the price of the product or service. When a commercial enterprise
treats discovery costs in this manner, the substantive impact is likely
to be both substantial and predictable. When consumers make their
purchasing decisions, they determine the commercial viability of the
product or service based in part on discovery costs. Whether a par-
ticular product or service is to remain viable in the marketplace is af-
fected by the costs of preparing discovery responses.
to the limitations of subdivision (b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii).” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory
committee’s note (2000). It did so because “[t]he Committee has been told repeatedly that
courts have not implemented these limitations with the vigor that was contemplated.” Id.; see 8
WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 35, § 2008.1 (discussing the “difficult problem courts
face in implementing the proportionality concept” for discovery procedures).
168. See supra Part I.C.
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Of course, if one assumes that discovery costs are properly
treated as costs of doing business, then nothing is wrong with this re-
sult. Presumably the price of a product or service at the very least re-
flects all the provider’s costs of doing business to ensure the making
of a profit. If the value of the product or service to consumers does
not justify the provider’s business costs plus profit, then consumers
will not pay for it and the product or service dies. Under this system
of economic Darwinism, inefficient products or services are rejected
by the market. Problems arise, however, if a product is made to re-
flect a cost that is artificial or not properly attributed to it. In that
event, the societal choice of the free market is skewed.
The imposition of inherent costs may have an external effect in
other ways as well. Entities that are regulated by substantive law
naturally assume additional costs to achieve compliance with the re-
quirements of that law. When the litigation process gives rise to sub-
stantial extraneous costs, regardless of whether the regulated entity is
found to have violated substantive regulatory directives, an entity
may be induced to over-deter to avoid not only liability but also the
lawsuit itself. In such an event, whatever substantive economic bal-
ance courts, legislators, or regulators have settled upon will be upset,
because expenses beyond those projected will have been expended to
avoid even the processes for determining liability.
In two ways, then, the current discovery system can undermine
maintenance of the substantive-procedural balance that is so impor-
tant to the litigation matrix.169 When combined with the internal utili-
tarian damage flowing from the excessive discovery associated with
the externalities of the current discovery framework,170 it is clear that
the existing discovery structure threatens core values of the litigation
matrix. As previously noted, if the costs of preparing discovery re-
sponses are appropriately characterized as costs of doing business,
then there is nothing improper in allowing those costs to affect sub-
stantive economic decisionmaking. It is highly questionable that this
is the case, however. Costs of discovery response flow from the uni-
lateral and unreviewed decision, usually of a private individual, to file
a lawsuit. Even when a government agency files suit, no judicial offi-
cer has at any point approved, ordered, or reviewed the agency’s de-
cision to sue. When the suit is filed within the framework of a notice
169. See supra Part III.A.
170. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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pleading system, as embodied in the Federal Rules,171 the factual alle-
gations contained in the pleadings are judged by lax standards, be-
cause it is understood that more detailed knowledge of the facts must
await further development through the elaborate discovery process
provided for in the rules.172 Indeed, shifting the fulcrum of the litigat-
ing process from the pleadings to the post-discovery stage was the
major insight of Judge Charles Clark, the primary drafter of the origi-
nal Federal Rules.173
Although this dramatic shift in adjudicatory philosophy has done
much to further the truth-finding values so essential to the goals of
the litigation matrix, it also has had the inescapable effect of allowing
the unilateral decision of a private individual or entity to impose of-
ten substantial ancillary costs on another private party, regardless of
whether the suit ultimately would be found meritorious. The added
costs the responding party must pass on, then, are not ones imposed
by a governmental entity or even by a jury after a deliberative proc-
ess. It is therefore questionable whether the skewing of substantive
interests and the undermining of adjudicatory efficiency goals that
could flow from these added costs can be cavalierly rationalized as a
“cost of doing business.” They are a cost of doing business only if one
has concluded that the unilateral, unreviewed choice of a private en-
tity to take advantage of the legal system should be allowed to trigger
an added cost to a commercial enterprise.
One conceivable means to avoid these problems would be to
abandon the notice pleading system in favor of a more “front-loaded”
system, demanding substantially more detailed factual allegations at
the pleading stage, combined with severe penalties for fabrication.
But in doing so, society would sacrifice the significant benefits of the
notice pleading system and place plaintiffs in the Catch-22 of allowing
them to get to the discovery stage only if they basically do not need
it.174 More vigorous use of the summary judgment device could help,
but because in a notice pleading system it would make little sense to
171. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (requiring only “a short and plain statement” of the claim).
172. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37 (dealing with discovery).
173. See RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 128–30
(3d ed. 2000) (recognizing Clark as “the creator of the ‘notice pleading’ concept”).
174. It was largely for this reason that the 1983 amendment to Rule 11, requiring that liti-
gants certify that claims in pleadings are “well grounded in fact,” was abandoned in 1993. FED.
R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1983). In effect, the 1983 amendment had indirectly
reintroduced a type of fact pleading, thereby depriving litigants of the opportunity to take ad-
vantage of the discovery framework.
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allow summary judgment prior to the availability of widespread dis-
covery, this is not likely to be an effective answer.
The correct response may appear obvious: simply shift the costs
of preparing discovery responses from the party responding to the re-
quest to the party making the request, subject to possible re-shifting
once the outcome of the suit is known. When the request is made to a
defendant, such a cost-shifting process would avoid the ancillary sub-
stantive skewing that could flow from imposition of the discovery
costs onto the defendant at the outset, and could perhaps be re-
shifted to the defendant if and when plaintiff ultimately prevailed on
the merits. When the request is made to a plaintiff, imposing response
costs on the defendant would have the benefit of preventing defen-
dants from bleeding less resourceful plaintiffs dry through a barrage
of questionable (though colorable) discovery requests. Moreover,
when the party making the discovery request must bear the cost of
that request, the externality problem is avoided and, assuming the
party to be a rational economic actor, the discovering party will be
deterred from engaging in wasteful, burdensome, or abusive discov-
ery requests. Both the utilitarian goals and the desire to maintain the
substantive-procedural balance that make up such an important part
of the litigation matrix would be furthered as a result.
If the issues were this simple, however, presumably this change
would have been imposed long ago. It would be naive to believe that
a simple cost-shifting model would be free of difficulty. Unlimited
cost-shifting could significantly exacerbate preexisting economic dis-
parities between litigants, and, where the costs involved are prohibi-
tive, seriously threaten achievement of the goals underlying the gov-
erning substantive law by effectively precluding private enforcement.
Many laws enacted for the purpose of assisting those in a vulnerable
political or economic position—for example, civil rights laws—could
be undermined by unlimited shifting of discovery costs. Thus, careful
structuring of the process is required to achieve the beneficial goals of
discovery cost-shifting without undermining the other values sought
to be achieved by the litigation matrix. Such structuring is likely to
give rise to its own set of transaction costs, due to the systemic re-
sources that would need to be committed to its implementation. This
could threaten the matrix’s goal of efficiency.
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It is at this point that one needs to recall the unique situation of
modern electronic discovery.175 One is able to predict that as a cate-
gorical matter electronic discovery is likely to give rise to new and
significant costs and burdens unseen in traditional discovery and to
some of the same costs as traditional discovery, but in considerably
intensified form. This may not be true in every instance, but it is true
in enough instances to justify an ex ante categorical distinction. Be-
cause the solution to the problems of the internal and external costs
of the current discovery process may give rise to almost as many diffi-
culties as the discovery itself, it is appropriate to confine its use to
situations in which the discovery problems are likely to be the most
severe. It is in part for this reason that I recommend the conditional
cost-shifting model, developed in detail in the next Part, only for elec-
tronic discovery.
IV.  SHAPING THE CONDITIONAL COST-SHIFTING MODEL
FOR ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY
A. The Elements of the Conditional Cost-Shifting Model
For reasons discussed above, an unlimited cost-shifting model
would give rise to its own set of problems. Therefore, the model I
fashion to deal with the costs and burdens of electronic discovery
would shift the costs of preparing a discovery response to the re-
questing party only when certain conditions are met. The model
would work in the following manner:
Step 1. For the model to be triggered the responding party must
file an objection to a discovery request, on the grounds that (a)
all or a significant portion of the response will necessarily in-
clude electronically stored data, and (b) that data is not rea-
sonably accessible in the ordinary course of business.
This step is included because unless the responding party chooses
to raise the cost-shifting issue, it makes sense, due to the significant
transaction costs involved, to leave the costs of the discovery process
where they initially fell. Only litigants whose responses would include
all or a significant amount of electronically stored data can make the
cost-shifting objection, because for reasons already explored it makes
175. See supra Part II.
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sense to confine the model’s reach to the category of cases in which
the harms of discovery can be predicted to be at their height.176
The step employs “the ordinary course of business” as a conven-
ient touchstone for measuring the disruptive impact caused by a dis-
covery request.177 Its assumption is that the relatively minimal costs
associated with producing electronically stored data readily available
in the ordinary course of business should be borne by the responding
party because the transaction costs required to impose transfer are
not worth the effort under a utilitarian cost-benefit calculus.178 The re-
sponding party would be required to make an affirmative showing
that the requested material is not readily accessible in the ordinary
course of business. It could usually accomplish this through affidavits
of responsible individuals describing the record storage system and
the burdens of producing the material. The requesting party could
dispute the respondent’s assertions on two conceivable grounds: (1)
the material is in fact readily accessible in the ordinary course of
business, or (2) though the material is not readily accessible in the or-
dinary course of business as respondent has stored it, the storage sys-
tem was designed negligently and/or is inconsistent with industry
practices. The discovering party must be allowed the opportunity to
make such a showing, lest a respondent be permitted to purposely
structure its data storage system in a manner designed to prevent dis-
covery. It should be noted that although the responding party’s objec-
tion must indicate the relevance of electronic discovery, the discovery
request need not specify that electronically stored data is involved.
Discovering parties cannot reasonably be expected to know which
documents belonging to the responding party are stored electroni-
cally.
Step 2. If the requirements of step 1 are satisfied, the court will
order that the reasonable costs of preparing a discovery re-
sponse are to be imposed on the discovering party, unless the
court determines (a) that imposing discovery costs on the re-
176. See supra Part II.
177. Congress drew on a similar concept as a baseline in regard to electronic documents in
enacting the Freedom of Information Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(C) (1994) (“In responding
under this paragraph to a request for records, an agency shall make reasonable efforts to search
for the records in electronic form or format, except when such efforts would significantly inter-
fere with the operation of the agency’s automated information system.”).
178. Theoretically, a court could be directed to conduct that cost-benefit inquiry in individ-
ual cases, but the transaction costs of determining whether the transaction costs in any individ-
ual case are too great would itself be too great.
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questing party will create an intolerable financial burden that
the discovering party cannot reasonably be expected to satisfy,
given her available resources; (b) that imposing discovery costs
on the requesting party will undermine the policies embodied in
a governing substantive statute designed for the protection of
the discovering party; or (c) that imposing discovery costs on the
requesting party will not satisfactorily avoid the excessive bur-
dens imposed on the responding party inherent in preparation
of the response.
There are three situations in which a simple cost-shifting model
might give rise to more problems than it solves. First, cases will arise
in which, given the resources of the discovering party, it is reasonably
clear that the costs resulting from use of the model will be prohibitive.
Second, cases will arise in which imposition of such a financial burden
on the discovering party would be inconsistent with the legislative
policies underlying the governing substantive law, which has unambi-
guously been adopted for the benefit and protection of individuals or
entities in the position of that party. Third, there will be cases where,
from the perspective of the responding party, imposition of costs on
the requesting party will not avoid significant disruption of its day-to-
day operations, because even though the requesting party will pay the
costs it still will be necessary for employees of the responding party to
prepare the response at a loss of significant person-hours.
The first two considerations are designed to protect both the
maintenance of the substantive-procedural balance and fundamental
fairness, both important elements of the litigation matrix. Where it is
clear that the requesting party lacks the resources to pay for the dis-
covery request, that inability should not necessarily sound the death
knell of the discovery request. Such rigid economic Darwinism could
lock in the existing distributive structure in ways not contemplated by
the governing substantive law. It would not automatically follow that
in such a case costs would remain on the responding party. It would
follow, however, that in such an event a more complex inquiry is re-
quired. It also should be noted that in assessing the reasonable likeli-
hood that the requesting party will be able to bear the costs of its dis-
covery requests, it would be necessary to take into account the full
picture of the structure of representation. For example, in a suit
brought by a poor injured victim, it would defy reality to examine
only the plaintiff’s resources if his attorneys are established plaintiffs’
lawyers who regularly finance such suits as investments. Ironically, in
such situations it is appropriate to view the costs of discovery as a cost
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of doing business for the plaintiffs’ attorneys. Thus, where it is estab-
lished that plaintiff’s attorneys are already financing other aspects of
the suit, the fact that the plaintiff himself is unable to pay discovery
costs should be irrelevant.
In certain situations, imposition of costs on a requesting party
could threaten core policy choices embodied in governing substantive
statutes adopted for the express purpose of protecting that party and
others situated similarly. In such cases, shifting discovery costs could
seriously threaten maintenance of the substantive-procedural bal-
ance. The situation would be reminiscent of the so-called “Converse
Erie” doctrine, designed to determine under what circumstances a
state court enforcing substantive federal law is required to employ
federal procedures in the adjudication of the federal claims.179 In its
decision in Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co.,180 the
Supreme Court held that in enforcing the negligence cause of action
contained in the Federal Employers’ Liability Act181 (FELA) the state
court was required to resolve factual questions about the defendant’s
alleged fraud in obtaining the release of claims by means of a jury,
even when state law would have the judge make the same determina-
tion.182 The FELA was adopted by Congress to provide special protec-
tion to injured railroad workers; thus, it was reasonable to require
that procedures likely to favor those plaintiffs in negligence suits
against their employers—such as the use of jury trial—were necessary
to further the purposes of that substantive policy.183 Similarly, if a leg-
islature consciously has chosen to protect a group of plaintiffs in need
of special assistance, and the imposition of discovery costs would ef-
fectively prevent or hinder that protection, then the court should de-
cline to impose such costs on the protected party. The circumstances
179. See, e.g., Alfred Hill, Substance and Procedure in State FELA Actions—The Converse
of the Erie Problem?, 17 OHIO ST. L.J. 384, 413 (1956) (describing how the Supreme Court has
drawn, especially in Federal Employers’ Liability Act cases, “a new demarcation of the line be-
tween substance and procedure” when “state courts give effect to federally-created rights”);
Note, State Enforcement of Federally Created Rights, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1551, 1551 (1959) (dis-
cussing the degree to which the interpretation of congressional statutes should require that state
courts apply federal “procedural” rules).
180. 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
181. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1994).
182. Dice, 342 U.S. at 363.
183. See Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to Commandeer State
Courts: Implications for the Theory of Judicial Federalism, 32 IND. L. REV. 71, 102–03 (1998)
(stating that the Supreme Court determined that “the right to a jury trial is ‘too substantial’ a
part of the FELA’s rights, and ‘part and parcel’ of the FELA remedy, as to be classified as a
purely procedural rule”).
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in which such a situation is found to exist, however, should be nar-
rowly confined. In the absence of express legislative directive, costs
should be shifted unless doing so would unambiguously undermine
substantive legislative policies. Civil rights suits are likely to make up
the bulk of such exceptional cases, since civil rights laws are adopted
for the specific purpose of protecting individuals who are in special
need of protection because of their uniquely vulnerable position in
society. Also, these considerations should be considered relevant only
when a legislative body has created the underlying cause of action,
lest the category grow so large as to consume the rule.
Instances also may arise in which cost-shifting will not resolve the
problems because transferring costs would not effectively prevent the
imposition of disruptive burdens on the responding party. Situations
may occur where, due to relevant technology, identification and pro-
duction of the requested data will require significant effort that, as a
practical matter, cannot be transferred to the discovering party, either
because the discovering party lacks the technical background or
mechanisms to produce the material184 or because providing the dis-
covering party with access to the respondent’s electronic storage sys-
tem would be impractical for business or strategic reasons.185 In such a
case, it still would make sense to shift costs, but it would not neces-
sarily follow that the discovery should be allowed in any event.
Step 3. If one or more of the conditions described in step 2 is
found to exist, the court is to engage in a cost-benefit inquiry in
which it considers (a) the likelihood that discovery will lead to
relevant data, (b) the extent to which the discovery to be or-
dered would impose significant burdens on the responding
party, (c) the extent to which the burdens of the discovery are
likely to be excessive or wasteful; and (d) the extent to which
costs may be shared or burdens reduced through more narrowly
framed measures.
184. See, e.g., Sattar v. Motorola, Inc., 138 F.3d 1164, 1171 (7th Cir. 1998) (describing how,
even though the defendant had produced e-mail data in the form of four-inch tapes, the plaintiff
still sought 210,000 pages in hard-copy format because he lacked the equipment and software to
read the tapes).
185. See Giacobbe, supra note 61, at 289 (“[A]ccess [to the responding party’s computer sys-
tem] is extremely risky for the [respondent] because the [discovering party] would then have
‘free reign’ over the [respondent’s] files. This poses the risk that the [discovering party] will gain
access to sensitive or privileged data. Thus, most defendants are not willing to undertake such
severe potential risks.”).
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If the court finds that any of the conditions described in step 2
exist, the next step is to engage in a complex—and not completely
satisfactory—individualized cost-benefit analysis, similar in many
ways to the one provided for in Rule 26(b)(2).186 Admittedly, such an
inquiry suffers from all of the difficulties that currently plague the in-
dividualized, unguided, and largely unpredictable judicial inquiry un-
der Rule 26(b)(2).187 There would be one significant difference, how-
ever. Unlike the cost-benefit analysis provided for in Rule 26(b)(2),
the cost-benefit analysis under the conditional cost-shifting model
would be undertaken in a framework in which cost-shifting is the
governing presumption. The model’s adoption would signal accep-
tance of this value choice. It would be understood, at least implicitly
and perhaps even explicitly in the wording of the rule itself, that al-
lowing the costs to lie where they fell in cases of extraordinary elec-
tronic discovery was to be the exception, not the rule. This presump-
tion differs dramatically from the prevailing views under the current
structure.188
This shift in presumption cannot cure many of the ills that plague
the individualized inquiry. The question to be asked, however, is
whether any alternative is preferable. For reasons already made clear,
an unconditional cost-shifting model would not satisfactorily protect
all of the relevant interests. It is for that reason that alternative elec-
tronic discovery cost-shifting models that have been proposed or en-
acted have failed. For example, Texas Rule 196.4, which was adopted
in 1999 as part of a major revision of the state’s discovery rules, pro-
vides that parties seeking electronically stored data must specify the
form in which the data should be produced, and the responding party
must comply if the requested data and form are reasonably available
to the responding party in the ordinary course of business.189 It further
186. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2). The relevant text of Rule 26(b)(2) is reprinted, supra, at note
35.
187. The concern has been expressed by some academics
that ad hoc decisionmaking concerning appropriate judicial techniques for overseeing
more difficult cases may undermine fundamental procedural fairness. Under this
view, decisions concerning procedure should be made ex ante—before a judge is
aware of the details of a given lawsuit. If judges engage in ex post applications of pro-
cedure, they may imperil our sense of fairness.
McGovern, supra note 143, at 441.
188. See, e.g., S. Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 2 F.3d 1023, 1029–30 (10th Cir. 1993)
(“[T]he presumption is that the responding party must bear the expense of complying with dis-
covery requests . . . .”).
189. TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4.
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provides, however, that the responding party may object if it cannot,
through the use of reasonable efforts, retrieve the information or
produce it in the form requested.190 Under such circumstances, if the
court orders the responding party to respond to the request, the court
also must order the requesting party to pay the reasonable expense of
any extraordinary steps required to retrieve and produce the informa-
tion.191 No provision is made to allow the court to order the discovery
without also shifting costs.192 The Texas approach therefore fails to
provide the requisite safety valves needed to foster all of the goals of
the litigation matrix.
On the other hand, for reasons explained above, a near-rigid re-
fusal to shift costs would be even more harmful. Thus, there exists no
realistic alternative to an individualized cost-benefit inquiry. This in-
quiry would be reserved for cases of electronic discovery in which
simple cost-shifting is found to create prohibitive problems of sub-
stantive underenforcement or to impose prohibitive burdens on the
responding party.
B. Confining the Conditional Cost-Shifting Model to Electronic
Discovery
Unlike other proposals that by their nature are confined to the
technically unique aspects of electronic discovery,193 the conditional
cost-shifting model theoretically could be made applicable to any dis-
covery request. My proposal is confined to the context of electronic
discovery,194 however, because I candidly concede that my model
would not be free of costs or problems. Given its potentially complex
190. Id.
191. Id. For a description of the rule’s operation, see NATHAN L. HECHT & ROBERT H.
PEMBERTON, A GUIDE TO THE 1999 TEXAS DISCOVERY RULES G-15 (1999).
192. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4.
193. See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 163, at 70 (proposing a cost-shifting rule for all
“marginal” discovery requests); Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 12, at 374 (proposing an
amendment to the final paragraph of Rule 34(b), providing that “[a]ll electronically-stored in-
formation shall be produced in the same form in which it is stored. . . . Any party represented by
counsel requesting the production of electronically-stored information in printed form in addi-
tion to or instead of its electronic form shall bear all costs associated with the requested produc-
tion”).
194. I should emphasize that my proposed model is not intended to be confined by the con-
tent of the discovery request but, rather, by the respondent’s indication that the sought-after
material is stored in electronic form. In this sense, it differs from the approach embodied in the
Texas Rule. See supra notes 189–91 and accompanying text. It seems reasonable to have the
category triggered by the responding party, since the discovering party cannot be expected to
know, prior to discovery, how the responding party stores data.
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three-step process,195 the conditional cost-shifting model may give rise
to significant transaction costs, thereby imposing an administrative
drain on the system. Moreover, if a court reaches the third step of the
process, there exists a danger of unpredictability growing out of the
process’s reliance on the court’s ability to conduct a cost-benefit
analysis in an individual case. Thus, I seek to confine my model to
situations where one can predict that a particular discovery request is
likely to threaten the goals of the litigation matrix. For reasons dis-
cussed above,196 it is appropriate to recognize a dichotomy between
electronic and traditional discovery.
It may well be, as one court suggested a number of years ago,
that “[c]omputers have become so commonplace that most court bat-
tles now involve discovery of some type of computer-stored informa-
tion.”197 Clearly, the statement is more accurate today than when it
was written, though it would probably be an overstatement to assert
that all discovery in commercial litigation is now electronically based.
But if that were true, or if it becomes true in the future, there will be
no reason to alter the conditional cost-shifting model. The more that
electronic discovery takes place, the greater the number of instances
in which the threats the discovery process poses to the goals of the
litigation matrix justify the transaction costs and administrative bur-
dens the model would create.
C. The Conditional Cost-Shifting Model and Managerial Justice
There is little doubt that a court, acting under the Federal Rules
as they exist today, could choose to adopt an approach equivalent to
the conditional cost-shifting model that I have proposed. The fact that
the rules fail to draw a distinction between electronic and traditional
discovery should not prevent a district court from choosing to adopt
such a distinction in the cases before it, in light of the broad discretion
vested in trial courts. Given this fact, it might be argued that the
model need not be formally adopted in the form of an amendment to
the rules, even if one assumes its wisdom as a purely normative mat-
ter. Moreover, the argument might proceed, an amendment to the
rules should not be adopted, even if the model’s wisdom is assumed,
because its formal adoption would restrict the managerial discretion
that trial courts should retain to control the adjudicatory process un-
195. See supra Part IV.A.
196. See supra Part II.
197. Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 462 (D. Utah 1985).
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der the circumstances of individual cases.198 As Richard Marcus has
noted, “turning to the judge for direction [in the control of discovery]
has become increasingly attractive and important to lawyers.”199
The adoption in 1983 of Rule 26(b)(2), vesting broad discretion
in the trial court to employ cost-benefit assessments to limit and con-
trol discovery,200 was designed to emphasize the trial judge’s ability to
fashion individualized controls.201 When combined with significant ex-
pansions of judicial power to monitor discovery through a process of
multiple pretrial conferences,202 this provision potentially interposed
the trial judge into the discovery process as a virtual micro-manager.203
One may debate the extent to which this system improved discov-
ery.204 After all, since 1983 the Advisory Committee has found it nec-
essary to amend the discovery rules three times, at least arguably in-
198. According to one scholar, under the managerial model judges “should not be restricted
to traditional methods but should be given substantial flexibility to design dispute resolution
procedures.” McGovern, supra note 143, at 445. McGovern notes “the significant commitment
made by academics and leaders of the judiciary in encouraging judges to become more active
litigation managers.” Id. at 441; see also Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The
Shortage of Adjudicative Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1808, 1832–36 (1986) (discussing the benefits and disadvantages of “managerial
judging” during discovery). But see Meade W. Mitchell, Discovery Abuse and a Proposed Re-
form: Mandatory Disclosures, 62 MISS. L.J. 743, 753 (1993) (stating that “one can hardly expect
judicial involvement to cure all discovery ills”).
According to a 1997 Federal Judicial Center Report, lawyers who were asked how to
alleviate discovery problems most often recommended increased judicial case management.
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICE, PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS
FOR CHANGE: A CASE-BASED NATIONAL SURVEY OF COUNSEL IN CLOSED FEDERAL CIVIL
CASES 2 (1997).
199. Marcus, supra note 36, at 781.
200. See supra note 35.
201. As the Supreme Court has noted, “Rule 26 vests the trial judge with broad discretion to
tailor discovery narrowly and to dictate the sequence of discovery.” Crawford-El v. Britton, 523
U.S. 574, 598 (1998). In its accompanying note to the 1983 amendment, the Advisory Commit-
tee stated that “[t]he rule contemplates greater judicial involvement in the discovery process
and thus acknowledges the reality that it cannot always operate on a self-regulating basis.” FED.
R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (1983).
202. FED. R. CIV. P. 16.
203. See Dudley, supra note 159, at 189 (noting that the “‘managerial approach’ requires
early and continuous judicial involvement to define issues, limit discovery, govern the stages of
discovery, promote stipulations of fact, and streamline the pretrial phases of a case, often
through frequent pretrial conferences”).
204. Six years after the 1983 amendments, a Harris Poll survey of state and federal judges
indicated that forty-seven percent believed that discovery abuse remained a major cause of de-
lay in modern litigation, and another forty-six percent believed it remained at least a minor
problem. Harris & Assocs., Inc., Judges’ Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State and
Federal Trial Judges Who Spent at Least Half of Their Time on General Civil Cases, 69 B.U. L.
REV. 731, 735 (1989).
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dicating their lack of total satisfaction with the micro-management
process imposed in the 1983 amendments. Moreover, commentators
have questioned its fairness,205 cost-effectiveness,206 and ability to fulfill
the aims of the discovery process.207
Of greater concern for present purposes, however, is the manner
in which the managerial model, as embodied in Rule 26, effectively
insulates trial judges from any overriding policy choices that society
might adopt. It should be recalled that the discovery process has sig-
nificant implications for procedural values of adjudicatory efficiency
and substantive values of economic redistribution.208 If society were to
force itself constantly to remain within the straightjacket of the
managerial model, it would be impossible to implement whatever
categorical policy choices might be made.
To suggest that the managerial model should be constrained by
overriding policy choices in no way implies a total denial of judicial
discretion in discovery control. A distinction must be recognized be-
tween policy discretion and implementational discretion. Even where
policymakers have imposed specific value choices on the trial court,
the court necessarily will retain substantial discretion in determining
205. Concern has been expressed that the managerial approach “departs from the tradi-
tional model of judicial detachment and fairness” because “it embroils the judge in the pretrial
jockeying of the parties and exposes the judge to evidence as it is developed.” Dudley, supra
note 159, at 200; see also Resnik, supra note 13, at 423–31 (discussing the disadvantages of the
managerial approach, including the costs of using the judge’s time and the potential negative
effects on due process).
206. See Dudley, supra note 159, at 190 (arguing that “the managerial approach is not cost-
effective in most civil cases”). But see Jack B. Weinstein, What Discovery Abuse? A Comment
on John Setear’s The Barrister and the Bomb, 69 B.U. L. REV. 649, 651 (1989) (noting that
“[t]he modern federal judge now has highly skilled federal magistrates to assist in controlling
discovery”).
207. One commentator has suggested that
judges unrealistically tend to assume that discovery’s cooperative ideal should be re-
alizable in all cases. It is well known that judges dislike discovery disputes and that
some resent the time that resolving them takes from other judicial activities. Not in-
frequently, judges neglect lawsuits in which the lawyers are engaged in discovery bat-
tles, allowing them to languish unattended on their dockets while the lawyers founder
ever deeper into non-cooperation, confrontation and impasse . . . .
John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery’s Fatal Flaw, 84 MINN. L. REV. 505, 518 (2000).
In particular, questions have been raised concerning trial judges’ level of familiarity with and
sophistication about computers. See Giacobbe, supra note 61, at 281 (noting that “it is becoming
increasingly obvious that a significant part of the judiciary does not realize the extent to which
individuals and businesses are using computers”); see also In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs
Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 997, 1995 WL 360526, at *2–*3 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995)
(describing a corporation’s use of electronic storage as the defendant’s choice).
208. See supra Part III.A.
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how best to apply those value choices under the circumstances of in-
dividual cases. However, if policymakers agree that the interest in ac-
curate truth-finding should be limited or even superceded at times by
the desire to avoid the unique burdens of electronic discovery, it
would be wrong to refuse to codify that value choice in the governing
rules for fear of confining judicial discretion in individual cases.
It has not been uncommon for the rules’ drafters to attempt to
send policy-based messages to trial judges through the amendment
process. Ironically, the very adoption of Rule 26(b)(2) in 1983 was a
message to the courts to beef up their control of discovery abuse.
There is little doubt that even before the 1983 amendment, trial
courts possessed sufficient discretion under the broad terms of Rule
26(c) to issue protective orders on grounds similar to those stated ex-
pressly in Rule 26(b)(2).209 In a technical sense, then, that provision’s
adoption was superfluous. The amendment nevertheless served a
valuable purpose, because it reemphasized the importance of such ju-
dicial authority. The same point is made even more starkly by the re-
cent amendment to Rule 26(b)(1), inserting a legally gratuitous refer-
ence to Rule 26(b)(2).210 This amendment in no way expanded judicial
power in a legal sense. Its purpose, then, was to remind courts of the
extent of their powers. An amendment to the rules to deal with the
unique problems of electronic discovery therefore could serve an ex-
tremely valuable legal and practical function. It would serve a practi-
cal function in that it would remind trial courts of their broad powers
in this area. It also would serve important legal functions, in two
ways. First, it would remove any doubt in the minds of trial judges
that they do, in fact, possess the power, as a general matter, to stratify
discovery restrictions on the basis of the nature of the data being dis-
covered. Second, and more importantly, it would unambiguously di-
rect judges who would not of their own initiative choose to draw such
a distinction, and who would not impose restraints on the scope of
discovery to adhere to these systemic policy choices, even if they run
counter to the judges’ own predilections. The fact that a court could,
under the current discovery rules, adopt a structure similar to the
conditional cost-shifting model in cases of electronic discovery is of
little help when the trial judge would not do so unless unambiguously
directed to do so by the rules.
209. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). The pertinent text is reprinted, supra, at note 34.
210. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
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V.  SPOLIATION, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY
AND THE LITIGATION MATRIX
Although spoliation issues are not covered by the Federal Rules’
discovery provisions, they are intimately related to the success of the
discovery process. Spoliation involves a litigant’s destruction of evi-
dence that is either relevant to the litigation or reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, in violation of a duty
to preserve that evidence.211 The issue is not dealt with directly in the
Federal Rules,212 however, and ambiguities and inconsistencies plague
the concept’s common law development. Specifically, it is not clearly
established at exactly what point in the litigation process the duty not
to destroy is imposed, or the level of requisite knowledge or intent on
the part of the party who destroyed the evidence.213 As to the former
question, the conceivable options include (1) when the litigant knows
or reasonably should know that a suit is about to be filed, (2) when
the suit is actually filed, (3) when a discovery request has been made,
or (4) when the court has issued a discovery order. Courts have dif-
fered on the point.214 As to the latter question, the options include (1)
211. See William T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1455 (C.D.
Cal. 1984) (holding that the court has authority to impose sanctions on a party that destroys
documents that it knows or should know will be relevant to the legal action); see also Linnen v.
A.H. Robins Co., No. 97-2307, 1999 WL 462015, at *11 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 16, 1999) (stating
that “[s]poliation of evidence occurs when there has been negligent or intentional destruction of
physical evidence which results in some unfair prejudice to the opposing party”).
212. Although Rule 37(b)(2) authorizes sanctions for the failure to permit discovery, this
authority under the rules often has been construed to be confined to situations in which the
party destroyed evidence following issuance of a discovery order. See, e.g., Capellupo v. FMC
Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545, 551 (D. Minn. 1989) (noting that “Rule 37 does not, by its terms, address
sanctions for destruction of evidence prior to the initiation of a lawsuit or discovery requests”).
In other cases, courts are said to draw on inherent supervisory power. See Gates Rubber Co. v.
Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 167 F.R.D. 90, 107–08 (D. Colo. 1996) (explaining the coexistence of
procedural rules that impose sanctions and the court’s inherent power to impose sanctions).
213. Richard F. Ziegler & Seth A. Stuhl, Spoliation Issues Arise in Digital Era, NAT’L L.J.,
Feb. 16, 1998, at B9:
The murkiest aspect of the spoliation law is the determination of when the obligation
to preserve evidence arises. The applicable rules and statutes do not specifically ad-
dress spoliation and, consequently, offer little guidance on this question. Judges seem
to take a fact-based, “I know it when I see it” approach.
214. Compare Giant Food Stores, Inc. v. K-Mart Corp., No. 94-6817, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17831, at *6–*7 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 1996) (holding that spoliation cannot be found before suit is
commenced), with Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 72–73 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(holding that a duty to preserve arises when the party possessing evidence has notice of its rele-
vance), William. T. Thompson Co., 593 F. Supp. at 1455 (“Sanctions may be imposed against a
litigant who is on notice that documents and information in its possession are relevant to litiga-
tion, or are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and destroys
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a requirement of willful intent, (2) a requirement of negligence, or (3)
strict liability. Also unclear is the appropriate sanction to be imposed
for violation of the duty of preservation. Traditionally, the primary
sanction is an instruction to the jury to infer that the destroyed infor-
mation would have established the point the opponent sought to util-
ize the information to establish.215 In extreme cases of willful destruc-
tion, however, outright dismissal or entry of default judgment may be
appropriate.216
The focus of the present inquiry concerns the extent to which
spoliation issues should differ when the destroyed evidence is of the
electronic variety. Just as the technical uniqueness of electronically
stored data must be recognized in fashioning controlling discovery
standards,217 so too must spoliation rules be modified in the electronic
context if the values sought to be furthered by the litigation matrix
are to be respected. Indeed, except in cases of willfulness, to treat the
spoliation of electronic evidence in the identical manner as spoliation
of traditional evidence is to attempt to fit a square peg into a round
hole. The distinctions between the two situations fall into two catego-
ries: differences in the reasonable presumptions of intent and differ-
ences in the reasonableness of requiring retention in the first place.
such documents and information.”), and Capellupo v. FMC Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545, 546 (D.
Minn. 1989) (sanctioning the defendant for the knowing, intentional destruction of documents
and evidence three months before a class action employment discrimination suit was filed be-
cause the defendant was on notice that suit was about to be brought).
215. See, e.g., Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998) (“It is a well-
established and long-standing principle of law that a party’s intentional destruction of evidence
relevant to proof of an issue at trial can support an inference that the evidence would have been
unfavorable to the party responsible for its destruction.”).
216. See, e.g., Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 102 F.R.D. 472, 486 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (entering
a default judgment after finding that the defendant had engaged in an ongoing program of the
destruction of all documents that might prove potentially harmful in the suit), aff’d in part and
rev’d in part, 775 F.2d 1440 (11th Cir. 1985); cf. Applied Telematics, Inc. v. Sprint Communica-
tions Co., No. 94-4603, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14053, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 1996) (“The en-
try of a default judgment or the imposition of a spoliation inference is inappropriate in the in-
stant matter. Although defendant is at fault, it did not willfully or fraudulently destroy evidence
with the intent to prevent plaintiff from obtaining it.”). Several states view spoliation as tortious
conduct, giving rise to a private cause of action. See, e.g., Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage,
718 P.2d 456, 463 (Alaska 1986) (asserting a “common-law cause of action in tort for intentional
interference with prospective civil action by spoliation of evidence”). But see Cedars-Sinai Med.
Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 521 (Cal. 1998) (holding that a party has no tort claim for
spoliation if he knew or should have known of the spoliation before trial or other decision on
the merits.)
217. See supra Part II.
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Both distinctions flow logically from the obvious and inescapable
technological differences between traditional and electronic data
storage.218 Many companies today store information electronically on
backup tapes that are capable of retrieval—usually with great diffi-
culty—in the event of system breakdown or natural disaster.219 For
spoliation purposes, two aspects of backup-tape storage are key: First,
the tapes record documents as they are created on the system re-
gardless of subject or category. Thus, the tapes are not organized in
any categorical manner. Second, because the volume of documents
recorded often will be enormous, many systems are programmed to
routinely and automatically write over tapes that were used previ-
ously, thereby erasing the documents that previously were recorded
on the tape.220 This is not true of traditional paper discovery. In the
case of paper documents, copies usually are organized categorically,
and an affirmative human act usually is required to destroy the cop-
ies.
The implications of these differences for spoliation purposes are
simple: (1) Electronic evidence destruction, if done routinely in the
ordinary course of business, does not automatically give rise to an in-
ference of knowledge of specific documents’ destruction, much less
intent to destroy those documents for litigation-related reasons, and
(2) to prohibit such routine destruction could impose substantial costs
and disruptive burdens on commercial enterprises.221 The first implica-
218. It has been suggested that “[t]he reasonableness of any particular document retention
program for electronic data . . . should be a function of the unique facts and circumstances that
have driven the electronic revolution. Specifically, the tremendous capacity and efficiency af-
forded by electronic instrumentalities should compel the implementation of longer retention
periods.” Christopher V. Cotton, Document Retention Programs for Electronic Records: Ap-
plying a Reasonableness Standard to the Electronic Era, 24 J. CORP. L. 417, 418 (1999). How-
ever, this argument ignores the fact that electronic backup tapes intermingle totally unrelated
documents and that it is both expensive and extremely burdensome to retain only specific
documents on a particular tape. Thus, retention necessarily means retention of all documents on
a particular tape. This, of course, is not a problem requiring retention of paper documents.
219. See supra notes 85–93 and accompanying text.
220. “[E]lectronic evidence can be easily and inadvertently destroyed through routine reten-
tion and backup schedules, because of the processing requirements of the computer system or
for many other human, hardware and electronic reasons . . . .” Daryll R. Prescott et al., Elec-
tronic Data Balancing Act: Preserve or Delete?, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 17, 1998, at B7; see also Linnen
v. A.H. Robins Co., No. 97-2307, 1999 WL 462015, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 16, 1999) (“The
recycling of . . . back-up tapes is, under normal circumstances, a widely accepted business prac-
tice as, in the absence of a disaster which necessitates the use of the tapes, there is no need to
keep them for an indefinite period of time.”).
221. One group of commentators points to a particularly troubling example:
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tion is arguably important in the spoliation context because some
level of fault—whether willfulness or negligence—usually has been
required for the imposition of sanctions.222 Indeed, if the logic of a
primary spoliation sanction—taking as established the point that the
other litigant wished to make on the basis of the destroyed evi-
dence—is the assumption that the party who destroyed potentially
relevant evidence did so “out of a realization that the [evidence was]
unfavorable,”223 then imposition of such a sanction in the case of rou-
tine electronic destruction in the ordinary course of business is wholly
improper. The destruction would have taken place, regardless of sur-
rounding legal circumstances.224
We could choose to impose a strict liability standard on potential
defendants, giving them the responsibility to affirmatively identify
and preserve all documents on their backup tapes that are relevant to
or likely to lead to relevant evidence in an ongoing or future litigation
[O]ne Fortune 500 company recently received a data preservation order that the
company believed would cost in excess of $750,000 to fulfill properly. Based on the in-
formation provided by the IT department, the general counsel determined that 60,000
backup tapes in its multisystem, multilocation corporate backup system should be
removed from its backup tape rotation schedule. Had the company pursued that total
data preservation strategy, it would have incurred the cost of purchasing 60,000 new
backup tapes to fill the void in the backup rotation, at a cost of about $10 per tape,
and other appurtenant costs of compliance with the preservation order. . . . Instead,
the company . . . hired specialists to conduct a data preservation analysis, which en-
tailed interviewing the company’s IT staff about the company’s technology infrastruc-
ture . . . and other necessary staff . . . . Based on the findings . . . the company reduced
the amount of data to be preserved by over half.
 Prescott et al., supra note 220, at B7.
222. See supra notes 215–16 and accompanying text. For a contrary view, consider the opin-
ion of some other commentators:
The duty to preserve becomes especially significant in the arena of electronic data be-
cause the courts have upheld sanctions for the inadvertent destruction of data result-
ing from an organization’s normal business practices. Therefore, a company that fails
to intercept its record retention and destruction processes in order to ensure preser-
vation of relevant information risks liability for spoliation of evidence.
Prescott et al., supra note 220, at B7 (citation omitted).
223. Blinzler v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 81 F.3d 1148, 1158 (1st Cir. 1996).
224. Courts have not foreclosed the possibility that “the good faith disposal of documents
pursuant to a bona fide, consistent and reasonable document retention policy” might provide an
acceptable justification for failing to produce requested documents. Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 102 F.R.D. 472, 486 (S.D. Fla. 1984), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 775 F. 2d 1440 (11th
Cir. 1985). However, courts also will inquire whether that retention policy is reasonable. The
Eighth Circuit has indicated that in making this reasonableness determination the district court
should examine the reasonableness of the policy “considering the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the relevant documents . . . . A three year retention policy may be sufficient for docu-
ments such as appointment books or telephone messages, but inadequate for documents such as
customer complaints.” Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 1988). The
court also considered whether the retention policy was instituted in bad faith.
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of which the party is aware. The rationale for such an approach would
not be that one presumes the destructions to have been improperly
motivated, but rather that preservation can do much to advance the
cause of truth-finding. It is, after all, indisputable that the destruction
of documents that might be probative in litigation could undermine
attainment of fact-finding accuracy. As in the field of products liabil-
ity, then, courts would impose a standard of strict liability on defen-
dants, not to punish or deter unacceptable behavior, but to induce a
higher standard of defendant behavior, thereby bettering society. But
as previously noted,225 accuracy has never been deemed the exclusive
goal of the litigation matrix; otherwise, society would not allow any
evidentiary privileges. At some point, society must be willing to cut
back on the search for truth to take account of other values the litiga-
tion matrix serves, including the utilitarian concern for efficiency, the
need to preserve the procedural-substantive balance, and the need to
provide predictable standards of primary behavior.226 An absolute
strict liability retention standard, triggered by the mere potential of
suit, would severely threaten attainment of all three goals.
For commercial enterprises that face the constant threat of litiga-
tion, adoption of such a standard effectively would mean that the en-
terprise would be required to constantly review its backup tapes for
documents that could, at some later point in the litigation process, be
deemed relevant; and if the enterprise predicted incorrectly, it would
risk imposition of severe sanctions. The expense of such a process
could easily prove prohibitive, because it would require the devotion
of an enormous and unending number of person-hours, by knowl-
edgeable individuals, to complete a careful review of unorganized
backup tapes. Yet the only realistic alternative to such a burden
would be a policy of total retention indefinitely—a practice that,
given the geometric increases in document volume in the electronic
age, could lead to the physical overrunning of a company with elec-
tronic equipment and severe retrieval burdens if and when the docu-
ments actually were needed in litigation. These are difficulties never
faced in the age of pre-electronic storage. Yet to this point, at least,
few courts seem willing to consider the possible need to adjust spolia-
tion standards. The need for such a reconsideration is well at hand.
In reconsidering spoliation standards in light of the modern
technology of electronic storage—as I believe must be done—it
225. See supra Part III.A.
226. See supra Part III.A.
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probably would make sense to intertwine the seemingly distinct in-
quiries into the timing of the imposition of duty to preserve and the
requisite intent necessary to trigger violations of that duty. For pur-
poses of determining when the duty to preserve is triggered, the ques-
tion should turn on whether the responding party chooses to object to
a particular discovery request. If the responding party does not file
such an objection (or seek an appropriate protective order pursuant
to Rule 26(c)), then the filing of a discovery request clearly describing
the category of documents to be produced should trigger respon-
dent’s absolute obligation to preserve all such documents. However,
if the respondent does object, consistent with its obligations under the
rules,227 then the point at which its absolute duty to preserve should be
triggered is the issuance of a discovery order by the court. Under
these circumstances, a party should not be allowed to defend on the
grounds that destruction occurred routinely in the ordinary course of
business. When a discovery order issues, the severe disruptive impact
caused by anti-spoliation rules is most clearly justified by the interest
in truth-finding.
It might be argued that delaying attachment of the duty to pre-
serve until issuance of a discovery order is unacceptable, because a
defendant simply could choose to destroy all relevant documents im-
mediately upon receipt of a discovery request. For at least two rea-
sons, however, the argument fails. First, under the standard proposed
here, a defendant could delay the obligation to preserve beyond re-
ceipt of a discovery request only if it planned to make legitimate ob-
jections to the discovery, and such objections are controlled by the
obligation under the rules not to interpose discovery objections solely
for purposes of delay. Second, as explained more fully below, under
my proposed standard any destruction other than those regularly
scheduled would be sanctionable, if the defendant was aware both of
the likelihood of suit and of the likely discoverability of the destroyed
documents. Thus, a defendant would not be allowed to willfully de-
stroy documents out of a fear that they may prove harmful in an im-
pending suit.
Although reasonable debate is possible over which moment
should trigger the duty to preserve—the moment of a discovery re-
quest or the moment of a discovery order—it should be clear that any
227. It should be recalled that a party could not, consistent with its obligations under the
certificate requirement of Rule 26(g), file an objection lacking any legitimate basis merely to
delay imposition of its obligation to preserve. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(2).
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earlier point in the litigation process would be inadvisable. Use of any
earlier demarcation point could lead to unlimited and chaotic disrup-
tion of electronic recordkeeping, as well as to the imposition of unfair
and unpredictable standards of behavior on defendants. If defendants
were obligated to preserve documents the moment they became
aware that a suit might be filed, large companies that regularly face
the possibility of suit would be required constantly to disrupt their
normal practices, presumably adopted because of their efficiency,228
merely because a suit was threatened. Nor is the time of filing a com-
plaint a more appropriate demarcation point for the obligation to
preserve electronically stored evidence, again because the disruption
for industries regularly subject to suit could be enormous.
To the extent that document destruction took place outside the
ordinary course of business (and it would be appropriate to put the
burden of proof on that point on the responding party), sanctions
could be imposed at a much earlier point in the litigation process. In
such a situation, if the discovering party can establish that the re-
sponding party was aware (or should reasonably have been aware) of
both the likelihood or actual existence of suit and the likely relevance
of the documents in question to that suit, then any document destruc-
tion outside the ordinary course of business would be sanctionable.
Thus, if the discovering party can establish that the documents in
question were overwritten before the time when they would have
been scheduled for destruction under the normal operation of the sys-
tem, then sanctions could be imposed.
The result of this process is not entirely satisfactory, since it
could easily lead to the routine destruction of potentially significant
evidence and thereby undermine attainment of fact-finding accuracy.
The alternatives, however, are even less satisfactory. In many cases, it
will be impossible for a potential defendant to predict exactly which
documents a court will, at a subsequent point, deem relevant, and, as
stated above, the burdens of segregating such documents from
backup tapes would be enormous. Yet for reasons already discussed,
the alternative of total retention is equally troublesome because of
the obvious and severe disruption it would cause to commercial rec-
ord-keeping practices. The only point at which such burdens should
be imposed is after a discovery request has been made absent objec-
228. Under my model, to the extent the discovering party can establish that the defendant’s
data storage system fails to represent the current state of efficient document retention followed
by similar enterprises, the defense of “ordinary course of business” may be lost.
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tion, or, if objection is made, after a discovery order has been issued.
At that point, routine destruction should not be allowed to continue,
and a litigant should no longer be permitted to rely on the defense
that destruction took place in the ordinary course of business.
It is conceivable that even under this structure, plaintiffs could,
immediately following the filing of a suit, seek a court order prohib-
iting defendants from destroying discoverable records. In theory, such
a course of action could protect both parties’ rights. It would protect
the plaintiff’s interest in assuring the availability of possibly probative
evidence, while at the same time removing any uncertainty from the
defendant concerning the nature and extent of its responsibilities.
However, if a court were to routinely grant a restraining order cov-
ering all of defendant’s electronically stored records, then such a pro-
cess would be no more satisfactory than what currently exists. If the
plaintiff-initiated process were to work satisfactorily, the court would
be required to employ the standards embodied in the third step of the
conditional cost-shifting model, fashioned here to govern the discov-
ery process.229 Thus, a court would not be permitted to begin with a
blanket presumption in favor of retention but would instead be re-
quired to conduct a careful weighing process, giving appropriate rec-
ognition to the possibly enormous costs, disruptions, and burdens of
widespread retention.
I should emphasize that the procedure just described to deal with
the spoliation of electronic evidence is by no means intended to be
written in stone. It is, rather, merely a suggested starting point for de-
bate. The point to be emphasized, however, is that whatever structure
ultimately is adopted, if it is to remain viable in the twenty-first cen-
tury it will have to take account of the technological realities of the
computer age.
CONCLUSION: BRINGING DISCOVERY INTO THE COMPUTER AGE
It should hardly be surprising that the discovery rules need to be
modified substantially to take account of the use of computers and
other electronic means of data storage. After all, other professions
have taken as a given the need to alter their rules, practices, and stan-
dards to deal with the implications of these technological changes.
For example, to teach architecture today the way it was taught in 1970
would be nonsensical in light of the dramatic impact of the computer
229. See supra Part IV.A.
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age on the profession. The same could be said of teaching legal re-
search at law schools. While certain fundamental concepts have re-
mained constant, it would be dangerous to ignore the significant prac-
tical impact of technological change. It should shock no one,
therefore, that similar modernizing changes are called for in the dis-
covery area.
This conclusion does not necessarily imply that the issues raised
by electronic discovery differ completely from those raised by tradi-
tional discovery. As has been true elsewhere, introduction of com-
puter technology has not so dramatically altered the preexisting
working structure as to render that structure completely irrelevant.
The goal must be to determine the subtle but potentially significant
ways in which the onset of the computer age has altered the profes-
sional topography, as well as the best ways to deal with those newly
created difficulties. The introduction of electronically based storage
has not altered the DNA of discovery; the process’s value to the at-
tainment of the litigation matrix’s goals is just as significant as it al-
ways has been, and the troubling problems to which the process tradi-
tionally has given rise continue to exist. Yet, the development of
electronic storage has introduced important new problems and sub-
stantially intensified many preexisting ones. As a result, though dis-
covery’s DNA may not have changed, the problems discovery creates
have increased, and the stakes have risen substantially. To continue to
employ pre–computer age discovery standards in the age of electroni-
cally stored data, then, would be the technological equivalent of
driving a horse and buggy down Interstate 94.
In this Article, I have undertaken several tasks. Initially, I ex-
plored the fundamental technological differences between traditional
and electronic storage and examined the practical implications of
those differences for discovery. I also considered the inherent and of-
ten overlooked ways the discovery process, as traditionally structured,
has failed to further the complex mixture of normative meta-goals
underlying the adjudicatory system embodied in what I have called
the litigation matrix.
I then sought to view those traditional failures in light of the
computer age, arguing that they have expanded exponentially, much
the way that electronically based storage systems have exponentially
increased storage capacities. I then proposed a conditional cost-
shifting model to deal with the problems of electronic discovery and a
spoliation model to deal with the routine destruction of electronically
stored data that plays a central role in modern storage systems. I fully
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recognize that neither of these models is free from question or doubt.
One conceivably could structure the governing model in a variety of
ways to strike different value balances. But the most important point
to be gleaned from this Article is that however one ultimately chooses
to shape the delicate balance of often-competing goals fostered by the
litigation matrix, a system of discovery control that fails to take ac-
count of the special needs and unique impact of the computer age is
destined to fail.
